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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
In general,

traditional philosophy prior to Kant

envisioned the world as something inexorably given to the

inquiring mind.

The inquirer, though part of nature, was

assumed to be outside of nature— —in a sense, an observer.
The world and the inquirer were related as object is to
subject.

Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism partly

reversed the order of this relationship.

He considered the

matter of the natural world as given, but the form of the
world as supplied by the inquirer.

imposes a structure upon the world.

In effect,

the inquirer

In the realm of

perception or sensibility, this structure consists of the
pure forms of space and time.

According to Kant, then, the

mind orders the manifold of sensation through application of
the a priori unifying forms of space and time.

Furthermore,

in the realm of the understanding, certain necessary

categories of thought are understood as the criteria and set
of rules through which the manifold of spat io temporally

ordered sensation becomes known to thought.
However, Kant's transcendental system was mainly

descriptive.

There still remained the problem of explaining

why particulars are positioned where they are in time and
space.

In other words,

why does one perceive things as one

.

ii

does and not otherwise?

A more general explanation was

needed to account for the peculiar pervasiveness
of time and
space in perception and conception as well as an
account of
the positioning of particulars within time and
space.

In

addition, within the realm of the understanding, the
Kantian

categories proved insufficient in describing all judgements.
Moreover, inconsistencies within Kant's transcendental

framework pointed toward new formulations of his basic
principles.

Neo-Kantians, such as Von Humboldt and Cassirer,

endeavoring to give greater explanatory power to the Kantian
hypothesis, contended that a third unifying agent, linguistic

necessity, is a more basic and comprehensive unifying agent
or form than space and time.

Moreover, language was seen to

provide a more inclusive set of categories ordering

conceptual activities.

Thus, Kant's system is seen to rest

securely upon the power of language as a conditioning agent
in sensibility, perception,

understanding, and reason in

general
Contemporaneous with the work of Ernst Cassirer, a
famous linguist, Edward Sapir, uncovered some important facts

concerning the relationship between language and thought
which were to be later developed and systematized by his
disciple, Benjamin Lee Whorf.

What emerged from the works

of these two men is the so-called "Whorf-Sapir hypothesis."
In essence,

their doctrine mirrors the neo-Kantian contention,

but claims to present empirical evidence on its behalf.

As

iii

such,

their endeavor purports to add substance to the
Kantian

system by giving It a base in language, empirically verifiable
through the sciences of linguistics and anthropology.

Throughout these developments, philosophy witnessed the
coming of a new philosophical movement.

English philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein

Sired by the great
,

this movement, called

linguistic philosophy or analysis, brought it3 new methods to
bear upon the problem at hand: the relation between language
and thought.

In this philosophical tradition, P. F. Strawson

has formulated a ’'metaphysics" which seems to support a

milder form of the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis.
to recognize,

Strawson was led

through epistemological and linguistic

considerations, the existence of a conceptual scheme which
we all must possess as a condition of our communicating with

one another.

The nature of this scheme is seen to be mainly

spatiotemporal.

Although developed without explicit reference

to the Kantian system,

Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics may

be seen to furth r bolster the Kantian contention in the face
of its

;ost

devastating criticism.

It is the purpose of this paper to examine the

philosophical contentions of Whorf

,

Sapir, and Strawson, in

regard to the relationship between language, the rare forms
of space and time, and the Kantian categories of the under-

standing.
t li e

This endeavor will proceed from an exposition of

Kantian position concerning the a priori structuring of

raw sensation and the functioning of the understanding to

criticism of these views and their subsequent implicit

iv

reformulations with reference to linguistic considerations.
This will involve an exposition of the possible senses of
the philosophies of

T

horf,

to the matter at hand;

Sapir and Strawson as they pertain

the senses in which language conditions

or determines the Kantian a priori particulars of time and

space and supplies the pure concepts of the understanding.
It is hoped that this enquiry will aid

in rendering explicit

the modern belief in the necessary connection between

language, thought, and reality.

PART ONE

KANTIAN TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN BRIEF

I.

KANTIAN TRANSCENDENTAL

I DEAL! S

IN

.RIEF

A. The Copernican Revolution

Modern philosophy began with faith.

Religion gave to

man a sense of general optimism and faith in the future.
is natural,

then,

It

that the first modern philosophers had

complete faith in the power of the human mind to attain
knowledge.

These philosophers, alike in their spiritual

beliefs, differed as to the methods by which such knowledge

could be reached and how far its limits extended.
ists,

Rational-

empiricists, realists, and nominalists of the age all

understood genuine knowledge as that which is clearly and

distinctly perceived as universal and necessary.

How this

knowledge was to be attained posed a great problem to them.
The seventeenth century was

a

century that witnessed

unparalleled progress in physics and mathematics.

The success

of mathematics and the mathematical method left a great mark

upon philosophy.

It was seen that it was possible to achieve

certainty in mathematics while other disciplines resulted in
only probable knowledge.

Philosophers of the day, aware of

age-old controversies in philosophy, hoped that by application
of the mathematical rnethod--deduction from "self-evident"

axioms according to rigorous, fixed rules

— solutions

to

philosophical problems could achieve a similar certainty.

2

The application of mathematical techniques to the

measurable properties of what the senses revealed became the
sole true method of philosophical inquiry and exposition.

Descartes systematically doubted all that was given to him
in

sense-awareness in the hope of finding, by the light of

nature, clear and distinct self-evident truths from which

solutions to philosophical questions may be deduced.
Analogously, Spinoza and Hobbes seek to give their reasoning
a

structure of a mathematical kind.

"Nationalism."

Such a method was called

Thus, traditional rationalists expressed the

belief in the power of the human mind to attain absolute

knowledge through the mathematical method of inquiry."^
The advent of the physical sciences, literally, brought
man to his senses.

The spectacular results of Newton re-

kindled an interest in the material world.

The philosophical

procedure of developing "first principles" and "clear and
distinct ideas" slowly gave way to the criterion of experimental evidence.

Observation and experimentation supplanted

the method of final causes as a valid philosophical procedure.
As mathematics left its mark upon the philosophy of the early

seventeenth century, so the experimental method influenced
the philosophy of the late seventeenth century and eighteenth

century.

The scientific attitude is exceedingly clear in the

works of Locke and Hume, who both had a profound respect for

1

Cf. Frank Thilly, A History of Philosophy (New York:
Henry Holt and Co,, 1927*5”] p] 393*

•

3

natural science, and also in those of Berkeley, who was deeply
concerned to deny its metaphysical presuppositions.

To all

of them the model was contemporary physics and mechanics.^
r
•

ith the coming of science and scientific methodology,

the rationalistic theory of knowledge, with its reference to
a priori ideas,

obsolete.

became, to the philosophers of the day,

A new epistemology was needed that would conform

to the rlew scientific spirit of observation and experimentation.

From the point of view of an empiricist, how does one account
for or define knowledge if sense experience is taken as a

criterion?

Moreover, this criterion of sense experience

implies man as the instrument and source of knowledge.

so human knowledge was

the senses were considered fallible,

considered capable of fallacies.

As

Since man is the basis of

knowledge, and all knowledge is necessarily human knowledge,
it was seen that knowledge depends on the nature of man and

his intellect.

J

These were the mainsprings of classical

empiricism.

Kant thus inherited two traditions of thought, namely

rationalism and empiricism.

In his day,

were, respectively, Leibniz and Hume.

their chief spokesmen

Leibniz argues lor the

self-legislative character of pure thought.
the dictum of Saint Thomas Aquinas,

He agrees with

"There is nothing in the

intellect which is not first in the senses," but adds,

2

Ibid.

3 lbid

.

,

p.

250

t

p.

3^5

.

"except

—
4

the intellect itself.”

Sense experience, he maintains, reveals

reality only in proportion to which it embodies principles
derived from the inherent character of thought itself.

Experience conforms to a priori principles and so can afford
an adequate basis for scientific induction/

1

Hume, on the other hand, questions our right to assume

the principle that every change has a cause.

He does so on

the grounds that the principle insists on the necessary

connection of two concepts between which no connection can be
detected by the mind.

In other words,

there is no necessary

connection between cause and effect, experience only finds
that one event follows another.^

This far-reaching conclusion,

that the principle of causality has no possible rational basis,

Hume extends and reinforces through his other doctrines

— that

so-called "synthetic reason" is merely generalized belief.
Thus, reason justifies itself by practical use, but can afford

no standard to which objective reality must conform.
Kant was educated in the Leibnizian tradition.
it was Hume's empiricism that

slumber."

6

However,

"awoke him from his dogmatic

While recognizing Hume's empiricism as significant,

Kant also recognized the force of his arguments against the

^Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics,"
Leibniz Basic Writings (La Salle, 111.: Open Court, 1957;,
p.

4'5f.

^David Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,"
Doubleday, I960), p. 322 f.
The Empiricists (Garden City, N. Y.
:

^Cf. Anthony Flew, Hume's Philosophy of Belief (London:
p! lOoT
Houtledge and Keegan PauT7 1961
)

,

,

.

5

presuppositions of science.

In the wake of Hume,

the results

of science were no longer "certain"
as the rationalists had
held.
If Hume was right, then science
collapses to a mere

science of chance justified only by its
practical use.
Consequently, Kant's problem was to reconcile
the
Leibnizian view of the function of thought with
Hume's view
of the synthetic character of the causal
principle.

strove

He thus

to determine how much of Leibniz's belief
in the

legislative power of pure reason can be retained after
full
justice has been done to Hume's damaging criticisms.'7
The

question with which Kant was to deal effected a synthesis of

rationalism and empiricism; that is, if the fundamental

principles upon which all experience and all knowledge depend
are synthetic in nature, how is it possible that they also be
a priori?

The answer to this question constitutes the whole of the

Kantian transcendental scheme which will be dealt with shortly.

Suffice it to say that Kant believed that the answer to this

question lies in the possibility of synthetic
judgements.

knowing.

8

a

priori

Such judgements arise from our peculiar ways of

According to Kant, the senses furnish the materials

of our knowledge and the mind arranges them in ways made

necessary by its own nature.

The content of our knowledge is

9

Gf. Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's Critique of
Pure season (London: Macmillan and Go. 1918) p. xxvf
,

^Gf. H. J. Pa ton, Kant's Metaphysics of Experience (London:
Allen and Unwin Ltd., and Mew York: Macmillan and Co., 1951) Vol.
»

I,

p.

76.

.

6

derived from experience

(

empiricism)

it according to a priori principles

the mind itself.

,

but the mind conceives

(rationalism) given by

In such a scheme we may have certainty of

knowledge, but such knowledge would apply only to the apparent

world

— the

world ordered by mind.

What reality is apart from

this apparent world is forever beyond the scope and power of
the human intellect.

Kant thus believes he has provided for a revolution in

philosophy similar to the Copernican revolution

in astronomy.

He has introduced a new method into philosophy, the trans-

cendental method, which for the first time, he believes,

criticizes philosophical methods as such.

Just as Copernicus

explained the apparent motions of the stars as due to the

motion of earthly observers, so Kant explains the apparent

character of reality as due to the mind of the knower. 9

An

exposition of the precise nature of this new method shall be
attempted, in part, in the next section.

9 Ibid

.

.

p.

75.

7
B.

1.

The Kantian Doctrine of Experience

Introduction

.

Kant’s major work, The Critique of Pure itenann
,

groundwork for his new transcendental science.

lays a

Here he is

concerned with our ways of knowing objects so
far as that is
possible a priori. Kant begins with dividing
the mind into

three major divisions, sensibility, understanding,
and reason
xhese modes of the mind’s way of knowing resemble
the

empiricist’s division of ideas into simple and complex.

In

the realm of simple ideas or sensibility the mind is
passive.

However, diverging from the empiricists, Kant regards this

passivity as applying only to the matter of experience.

In

the realm of the understanding, the mind is active in

conceiving objects of sense.

Each realm contributes an a

priori element to knowledge.

That part of the "Critique"

which deals with the a priori element contributed by sense is

called the "Transcendental Aesthetic."

In Kant's words:

The science of all principles of a priori sensibility
I call "transcendental aesthetic."
There must be
such a science forming the first part of the transcendental doctrine of the elements, in distinction from
that part which deals with the principles of pure
thought, and which is called "transcendental logic.” 10

Such a division of the human faculty of knowing is seen
to be an abstraction.

In dealing with the sensibility itself

the "aesthetic" must be understood as a provisional and

10 Immanuel Kant,

Critique of Pure Reason Translated by
Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and Co., 1929), p. 66.
(Hereafter referred to as CPR.)
.

8

incomplete account of knowledge of sensibility.

It is widely

believed, by Paton 11 for example, that Kant believed one
could

only fully understand his rational psychology after the

complete "critique" was properly understood.

Such a division,

therefore, is an abstraction, but one which must be made so
that certain elements of the mind
for analysis.

rnay

be properly isolated

Thus, Kant writes:

In the transcendental aesthetic we shall, therefore,
first "isolate" sensibility, by taking away from it
everything which the understanding thinks through its
concepts, so that nothing may be left save empirical
intuition.
Secondly, we shall also separate off from
it everything which belongs to sensation, so that
nothing may remain save pure intuition and the mere
form of appearance, which is all sensibility can supply
a priori. 12

It is important to understand what Kant means by "pure

intuitions."

A pure intuition is the form as distinct from

the matter of sensibility.

Kant believes there are two such

forms or pure intuitions, namely, space and time.

This is

expressed by him as follows:
I term all representations pure (in the transcendental
sense) in which there is nothing which belongs to
The pure form of sensible intuitions in
sensation.
general, in which all the manifold of intuition is
intuited in certain relations, must be found in the
This pure form of sensibility may
mind a priori.
If, then, I
also Itself be called pure intuition.
that
a
body
of
representation
take away from the
it,
regard
to
in
thinks
which the understanding
likewise
and
substance, force, divisibility, etc.,
what belongs to sensation, impenetrability, hardness,
color, etc., something still remains over from this
empirical intuition, which, even without any actual

^Paton,
12

op.

CPH, p. 66.

cit

..

p.

93*

9

object of the senses or of sensation, exists in the
mind a priori as a mere form of sensibility .13
Thus, it is found that there are two pure forms of
sensible

intuition serving as principles of a priori knowledge, namely,
space and time.

To Kant's consideration of these we shall

now proceed.
2.

The Metaphysical Exposition

.

Kant maintains that space is a pure intuition constituting

outer sense, a property of the mind through which objects are

understood as outside us.

Analogously, time is believed to

be a pure intuition constituting inner sense, by means of

which the mind "intuits itself and its inner states," 1 ^ in

which things are represented as related in time.

In his

"metaphysical exposition," Kant endeavors to prove these
points.

He presents us with five arguments concerning space

and five concerning time.

Because of the great similarity

and repetition of his arguments for space and for time, they

will here be combined and presented in an abbreviated fashion.
Firstly, Kant hopes to prove that space and time are not

empirical concepts.

As such, neither space nor time can be

derived from experience.

His proof proceeds as follows:

Space is not an empirical concept which has been
For in order that
derived from outer experiences.
certain sensations be referred to something outside
me (that is to something in another region of space
from that in which I find myself), and similarly, in
order that I may be able to present them as outside

*-3 ibid

.

l4 Ibid.

,

p.

67.

10

and alongside one another, and
accordingly as not
only different but as in different
.laces,
representation of space must be presupposed.?he
representation of space cannot, therefore, be The
empirically obtained from the relations of
outer
appearance. On the contrary, this outer experience
is itself possible at all only
through that
representation 15
,

.

ihus,

to know things as outside the mind
and related to each

other is not really to know them as in different
places, that
is,

dinerent parts of space.

The particular spatial relations

in which sensa are given cannot be reduced to
mere qualitative

dif f erences •

Space must in fact be presupposed as a condition

of such relations.

A similar argument follows for time.

for an example, an empirical concept such as "elephant-

ness" is presented all at once, in its entirety, by way of

one elephant as experienced.

But neither space nor time can

be an empirical concept for neither all space nor all time is

ever given in its entirety in experience.

We experience

only parts of space, although we know that this particular

space is part of the whole of space.
is never given in experience.

But the whole of space

Therefore space, and. likewise

time, are not empirical concepts.

Secondly, Kant shows that space and time are different
from sensations such as colors, sounds, etc.

They are

different, he maintains, because one can think an object

without its color, sound, weight, etc., but one cannot think
away its spatiality and temporality.

Of this Kant writes:

Space is a necessary a priori representation, which

15 Ibid

.

,

p.

68.

11

underlies all outer intuitions. We can never
represent to ourselves the absence of space,
though we can quite well think it as empty of
objects
It roust therefore be regarded as the
condition of the possibility of appearances, and
not as a determination dependent upon them. It
is an a priori representation, which necessarily
underlies outer appearances lo
.

.

Space is therefore, according to Kant, an a priori pure

intuition and necessary to all outer awareness, as time is
of inner awareness.

Color, hardness, etc., are not necessary

for our awareness of an object of knowledge, but spatiality

and temporality are.

Thirdly, Kant argues, space and time are not discursive

general concepts, but pure intuitions. 1 ?

To have a discursive

concept, one must be able to contrast such a concept with

others.

However, all objects are In space and in time.

There

is no way to compare or contrast spat io temporal experience

with non-spatiotemporal experience since the latter is never

given to us in sensation.

In other words, a discursive

concept contains the common marks of different individual
An intuition, however,

objects.

a single object.

For example,

intuit this particular circle.

I

is a single idea,

an idea of

conceive circularity, but

I

It is therefore evident, Kant

believes, that space and time are not discursive concepts but

pure intuitions.

This must be so because, he adds,

geometrical propositions, that, for instance,
in a triangle two sides together are greater than a
third, can never be derived from the general concepts
.

.

.

l 6 Ibid.
1?

Ibid

.

.

p.

69.

12

of line and triangle (by concepts
alone).
In summation,

space and time are pure a priori intuitions

oecause of the oneness of space and of time.

Different spaces

are all part of one space, different times
all part of one
time,

opace and time are, therefore, one and individual
and

as such are intuitions and not concepts.

Moreover, different

spaces must be thought of as within one all-embracing
space.
In fact,

Kant believes, different spaces are known as the

limitations of the one all-embracing space, which must be

presupposed from the start.

Space is a whole and time is a

whole and, therefore, is logically prior to its parts.

It

seoms evident to Kant to conclude that one pure intuition of

space and one pure intuition of time must underlie all

conceptions of space and time.
Perhaos the Kantian view of space and time can best be

understood within the context of other theories prevalent in
Kant's day.

By far, two theories of space and time exerted

the greatest influence upon Kant's contemporaries.

These

v.

ere

the "absolute" theory of Newton and the "relative" theory of

Leibniz.

Newton conceived of an absolute space and

an absolute

time existing in reality apart from objects temporally and

spatially related. 1 ^

As such, space and time were "receptacles.

Kant, however, rejects the Newtonian theory on the grounds

that space and time would be two eternal, infinite, nonentities

l?Cf. E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern
Doubleday Inc.
p. 244.
N. Y.
193^

Science (Garden City,

:

,

)

,

.

13

or "un things" 2o which exist but are rot real.

They exist, he

explains, merely in order to receive anything
real into

themselves.

Such a view, he believes, must be inconsistent,

for it is metaphysically untenable. 21
On the other hand, Leibniz conceived space and
time as

relations of appearances; relations abstracted from real
things in experience. 22

ilore

simply expressed, space and

time are characteristics of things.

Kant's doctrine may be

seen as mainly directed against Leibniz.
i^ant

If Leibniz is right,

maintains, space and time would be a mere generalization

from experience.
in his metapt

J

cr.l

ouch a belief was attacked and disproved

exposition.

He adds that even if space

and time were characteristics of things-in-themselves we could

never obtain the certainty that we do in mathematics, nor
could we assert the theorems of geometry as holding for the
real world.

These two conflicting theories, then, presented Kant with

hypotheses which he considered untenable.

If space and time

existed by themselves then metaphysical difficulties arise.
On the other hand,

if space and time are properties of things

then the certainty of mathematics is not assured.

It is not,

therefore, surprising that Kant was led to the belief that

2ll

Paton, op. cit

..

p.

132.

21 CPii, p. 80.

22cf. C. B. Garnett, The Kantian Philosophy of opace (Hew
York: Columbia University Press 1939
P 99
,

2 3cph,

p.

71.

)

,

•

14

space and time are universal subjective
forms of sensibility
allowing for the certainty of mathematics and
the objectivity
of science.
Thus, space and time are not realities or things
existing
in themselves, nor are they qualities or relations
of things

existing as such.

We must accept the fact, Kant believes,

that space and time are pure forms of intuition, subjective

mental forms, pure intuitions which must be presupposed in
order for an object to be known to the inquiring mind.

We

cannot think or perceive things without space and time, but
we can think without objects.

Hence, space and time are

necessary preconditions of phenomena and, thus, are necessary
a priori.

Such a classification provides geometry with a

base and explains and defends its certainty.

Unless space

were a pure intuition, geometrical judgements could not have
the necessity and universality which they, as a matter of
fact, have.

3.

Noumena and Phenomena

.

Assuming the validity of Kant's arguments for the
a priori nature of space and time, we are left with a novel

theory of perception.

According to Kant, the manifold of

sensation is objectified

experience

— through

of space and time.

— becomes

possible objects of

the mind's application of the pure forms
In perception,

then,

the manifold of

sensation is unified and synthesized through the application

15

of the a priori pure forms of space and
time. 24

In other

words, human perception must be spat io
temporal.

What objects

are apart from their spatiotemporal framework
is forever

unknowable.

The manifold of sensation, then, being
not yet

amenable to human awareness, constitutes a realm
of "thingsin-themselvQB
or objects of which we know nothing
'

other

,

than the fact that they are the matter of sensation
and are

somehow causally related to perception. 2 ^

Such things-in-

themselves, when arranged spatiotemporally by the human
a priori forms of space and time, become known to us
within

this spatiotemporal system.

We,

then,

live in a world of

appearances, a world in which reality is automatically
throttled spatiotemporally by the human mind.

What things-in-

themselves are, what reality is in itself, for humans, is a
moot question.
However, Kant does not mean that we, as humans, live in
a world of illusion.

To clarify this position, it would,

perhaps, be best to revert to Kant’s own formulation:

When I say that the intuition of outer objects and
the self-intuition of the mind alike represent the
objects and the mind, in space and time, as they
affect our senses, that is, as they appear, I do not
mean to say that these objects are a mere illusion.
For in an appearance the objects, nay even the
properties that we ascribe to them, are always
regarded as something actually given. Since, however,
in the relation of the given object to the subject,
this object of appearance is to be distinguished from
itself as object in itself. Thus, when I maintain that

24
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qU
1 ty of space and of time,
in conformity
??u which,
f}
with
as a condition of their existence,"
I posit both bodies and my own
soul, lies in my
mode of intuition and not in those objects themselves, I am not saying that bodies merely seem
to be outside me, or that my soul only seems
to be
given in self-consciousness.
It would be my own
fault, if out of that which I ought to reckon as
appearance, I made mere illusion. That does not
follow as a consequence of our principle of the
ideality of all our sensible intuitions quite the
contrary.
It i3 only if we ascribe objective
reality to those forms of representation, that it
becomes impossible for us to prevent everything
being thereby transformed into mere illusion. 26
,

—

Thus, the realm of phenomena, possible objects of

experience, is not illusion but a world of appearances.

It

is apart from the noumenal world of things-in-themselves only

because the nature of the human mind is such that it must
first spatiotemporalize this manifold before it can experience.
The phenomenal world is therefore a relative reality and

questions of ultimate reality are not pertinent to discourse
about it.
Such a view, while returning physics and mathematics to
the vaunted position they had prior to the skeptical philosophy
of Hume, serves also to greatly limit metaphysics.

Kant's

position brings rationalism and empiricism together to give
science a base--but at the expense of eliminating metaphysics
as a supersensible science.

Metaphysics would be possible

only if it concerned itself with the world of appearances,
the phenomenal world, the world as spatlotemporally ordered

Synthetic a priori propositions bear fruit only

by the mind.

26 CPE

,

p.

88.
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as applied to objects of possible experience.

Thus, as

science is saved by Kant's philosophy, metaphysics
is
eliminated.

we are forced to give up the metaphysics
of the

past and substitute for it a metaphysics of experience.

This

is so because we can have a priori knowledge of
things only in

so tar as what we know of them is impressed by the nature
of

our own minds.

Kant’s method introduces a new kind of

metaphysics, one which decides its own boundaries.

Kant

professes to give us certain knowledge within the limits of
experience.

If we seek to go beyond such limits we must do

so not by knowledge but by faith.

Kant's philosophy from the start, in the realm of

sensation, indicates the limitations upon our ability to

attain knowledge.
complete.

However, his exposition here is not

There is still the role of the understanding to

be investigated.

18
C.

1,

Introduction

Tlie

Understanding

.

In the previous section, Kant's theory of perception was

discussed with an eye toward his completed theory of knowledge.
It is seen,

however, that a theory of perception is not enough

to explain knowledge.

Mere unrelated and disconnected

percepts, mere perception of objects in space and time would

not yield knowledge.

For example, the mere perception of fire

followed by the perception of charcoal is not the same as

knowing that fire consumes wood.

Only by connecting two

experiences in thought in a certain way can one form the
judgement that fire is the cause of the consumption of wood.
The objects given to us in perception must be connected,

related, conceived, or thought for knowledge to come about.

The understanding, then, allows us to think the objects of

sensible intuition.

Thus, without sensibility no object

would be given, but without the understanding, no object

would be thought.
To make our percepts intelligible, we must first bring

them under concepts.

The understanding by itself cannot

intuit or perceive anything.

Analogously, the senses by

themselves cannot think anything.
that knowledge arises.

It is solely by their union

As Kant says,

"Thoughts without

content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."
He continues,

27 Ibid

.

.

"We therefore distinguish the science of the

p.

93.
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rules of sensibility in general, that is, aesthetic,
from the

science of the rules of the understanding in general, that
is
*
logic

.

,.28

Kant's account of the functioning of the understanding
and the exposition of these "rules

11

of the understanding are

found in his chapter on "Transcendental Logic."

This will

be the subject of the next section.

2.

Transcendental Logic and the Categories

.

The understanding has many ways of conceiving, relating,
and connecting percepts.

It is Kant's contention that the

general criteria that these powers of conception, relation,
etc., must measure up to, must be a supreme set of concepts.

These criteria of the workings of the understanding Kant calls
"pure concepts of the understanding" or "categories."

29

They

are called pure because Kant believes them to be a priori and
not derived from experience.
The understanding, Kant maintains, expresses itself in
judgement.

Accordingly, understanding is a faculty of

judgement.

It follows,

therefore, that the understanding in

conceiving is also judging.

Now, to discover the ways of the

understanding, the criteria to which its powers of conceiving
must conform, we must first analyse our judgements as to the
forms in which they appear.

Kant believes that one does not

have to search far for these forms of conception.
they are already given in the discipline of logic.
28
29

Ibid.
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seen,
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then,

that in logic,

in this case the Aristotelian logic of

Kant’s day, these forms of judgement are exhibited.
fbus,

the a priori concepts or pure concepts of the

understanding (categories) can be discovered by referring to
the basic forms of judgement which are already given to us
as the subject matter of formal

then possible,

so Kant believes,

(Aristotelian) logic.

It is

to deduce from these forms

of judgement, the categories which act as criteria and set

of rules for all the operations of the understanding.
then, are these forms of judgement?

What,

Kant says the following

If we abstract from all content of a judgement, and
consider only the mere form of understanding, we find
that the function of thought in judgement can be
brought under four heads, each of which contains three
moments.
They may be conveniently expressed in the
following table. 3l

I

Quantity of Judgement
universal
particular
singular
II

III

Quality
affirmative
negative
infinite

Relation

categorial
hypothetical
disjunctive
IV

Modality
problematic
assertive
apodeictic

3°

Ibid

.

,

p.

96.

^ 1 Ibid

.

,
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106.
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V.

hat has here been given us Is a "clue to
the discovering

of all pure concepts of the understanding.

Within the

preceding table are to be found the complete logical
functions
of all possible judgements as displayed in
Aristotelian logic.

Kant believes this list to be complete, as the
completeness
of Aristotelian logic was not questioned in his day.

what of the pure concepts or categories?

But

Kant tells us that

there are exactly the same number of pure concepts of the

understanding which apply a priori to objects of intuition
in general, as have been found logical functions in all

possible judgements,

lie

argues, then, that these functions

give an exhaustive inventory of the rules and criteria which
govern the workings of the understanding.

Thus,

the

completed categories are: 13
I

of

Quantity

Unity
Plurality
Totality
II

III

of Quality

of Relation
of Inherence and Subsistence
of Causality .and Dependence
of Community (reciprocity
between agent and patient)

Reality
Negation
Limitation
IV

Modality
Possibility Impossibility
Existence Non-existence
Necessity Contingency

—
—

32
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"This then," Kant says,

"is the list of all original pure

concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains
within
itself a priori. "^4 This list, he believes, is
necessarily
complete.
’Jpon

analysis of this table of categories, the first

thing that suggests itself is that they fall naturally into
nwo groups, which may be distinguished as the "mathematical"
and

'dynamical"

categories.

The former are concerned with

objects of perception; that is to say, they express the first

constitution of an object of experience by the synthesis of
elements into individual wholes.

For an example, let us apply

the categories of quantity, i.e., unity, plurality, and

totality.

By the synthetic activity of thought, elements of

perception, which are presented as a manifold, are combined

under one of these categories.
ness of a single object.

The product is the conscious-

Thus, before a line can be an

object of thought, the perceptual elements or parts of the
line must be given one after another and combined by thought
into the consciousness of a single line.

Thus, these

categories deal with the relation or connection of objects
of experience when they are viewed in themselves or separately.
The dynamical categories, on the other hand, deal with
the relation or connection of objects not taken singly.

are the categories of relation and modality.

34
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of relation are those which deal with objects as related
to

one another, the category of modality those which deal with
the relation of objects to the understanding.

These categories, then, are the ultimate criteria which

universally and necessarily apply to every thing so far as it
is a thing.

As universal and necessary,

pure a priori.

the categories are

They are imposed by the mind on objects of

possible experience given in sensation, and constitute the
bare forms of judgement, the criteria and rules governing the

function of the understanding.
an object be known by us,

In other words,

in order that

it must first consist of sensible

matter held together by the categories in a necessary
synthetic unity.

It is this necessary synthetic unity which

constitutes the universal and necessary character of any and
every object.

Hence, a category is a pure concept, a criterion

of the necessary synthetic unity which must occur if we are
to know an object.

The idea of synthesis is most important in Kant.

explains it as,

together

.

.

.

He

"the act of putting different representations

into a unity.

Accordingly, a synthesis of

the manifold of sensation is what first gives rise to

knowledge.

It gathers elements from the manifold and unites

them to form the concept of an object.

The next section will

deal with how such a synthesis takes place.

3 6 CPH,

p.

111.
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Transcendental Deduction and the Schematism

.

Having given us an account of the categories or pure
concepts of the understanding, Kant is faced with a pertinent
problem, namely, by what right and by what means do we apply

these mental forms of thought to things?
what is their objective validity?

In other words,

How do the categories,

independent of experience, apply to objects of experience?
Kant endeavors to attack these problems in his "Transcendental

^eduction."

In his words:

Now among the :anifold concepts which form the highly
complicated web of human knowledge, there are some
which are marked out for pure a priori employment, in
complete independence of all experience; and their
right to be so employed always demands a deduction.
For since empirical truths do not suffice to justify
this kind of employment, we are faced by the problem
of how these concepts can relate to objects which
they yet do not obtain from any experience.
The
explanation of the manner in which concepts can thus
relate a priori to objects I entitle their
transcendental deduction. 3?
Thus, as jurists call the proof of claims in a legal process
a "deduction,’' so a deduction of the categories is needed here.

Kant's deduction consists in showing that without the

categories intelligent activity would not be possible.
Accordingly, there can be no knowledge, no connected world of

experience without a unified or unifying consciousness or

self-consciousness

— the

synthetic unity of apperception, as

Kant calls it, which operates with these categories.

Under-

standing, then, is judgement, the act of bringing together in

37 Ibid

.

.

p.

121.

.
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one self-consciousness (unity of apperception)
the manifold
of perception. 38

The connectedness of objects, Kant believes,
is due

entirely to the human intellect.

Only in becoming conscious

of one's own identity, that one stands apart from the

manifold of objects, is one able to become aware of objects

proper and their connectedness, as distinct from isolated
Humean impressions.

Kant maintains that it must be possible

for "I think” to accompany all representations; for only in
so far as one can unite a manifold of given representations

into one consciousness,

is

it possible for one to represent

to oneself the identity of consciousness in those representa-

tions.

In other words,

awareness of self is only possible

under the presupposition of a certain synthetic unity, namely,
the synthetic unity of apperception.

The power of combination

does not lie in objects but is an affair of the understanding,
the faculty of combining a priori, of bringing the manifold
of given representations under the unity of apperception.
Thus,

the unity of apperception necessarily involves a

synthesis.

The reality of the thinking self consists solely

in its ability to connect together a variety of presentations

and while connecting them become aware of its own unity and

that of the sensible object which is being subjected to

judgement 39

3 ®There

are other syntheses indicated by Kant, as, for
However, because
example, the synthesis of the imagination.
they are of minor importance and for the sake of brevity, I
have not here included a discussion of them.
39 Ibid

.

,

p.

141.
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human beings are to become aware of
anything

if

given in sense, it is necessary that, first
of all, they
synthesize their representations, and secondly,

that they

become conscious of the fact that they themselves
are the
source of this synthesis.
ir

hat has been presented here is a simplification of
a

vastly complicated forest of Kantian terminology.

As I

believe no greater depth of exposition is required for our
purposes, suf ice it to say that so simple an act as the
:

perception of freezing water would be impossible unless the
mind comprehends two states and connects them in a single act
of thought.

The same synthetic unity of apperception which

is necessary in order that we may have judgement is necessary

in order that we have particular perception,

in order that

we may apprehend.

We know, then,

that the mind orders the manifold.

possible that we can know these
universe is ordered.

a

It is

priori forms by which the

Thus, we know that the perceived world

will always be connected to us in certain intelligible ways,
that our experiences will always be spatiotemporal and

connected as substance and accident, cause and effect,
reciprocity, etc.

We cannot go wrong, therefore, in applying

the c tegories to the world of things.
It is seen, however,

that Kant still has the problem of

explaining in detail how the categories, which are intellectual,
are applied to percepts, to sensible phenomena.

Pure concepts

and sensory phenomena are completely dissimilar or, according

3

.
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"heterogeneous.” 40

to Kant,

The question Kant is to deal

with is how concepts and percepts may be
"homogeneous."
says,

"In all subsuraptions of an object under
a concept,

He
the

representation of the object must be homogeneous
with the
concept.
How this is done comprises the contents
1

of

Kant’s chapter on "Schematism."
In order to solve this problem,

Kant believes there must

be some third thing which is homogeneous on the one
hand with

the category, and on the other with percepts. 42

This third

something must function in

a

it must be pure

and at the same time sensuous if

(a priori)

mediating capacity.

it is to apply equally to both realms.

Kant maintains,
this schema,

"is the

In addition,

"Such a representation,"

'Transcendental Schema'." 4 ^

It is

then, which serves as a mediator between

concepts and percepts.
What is the nature of this mediating something, this

schema?

Kant believes it to be our pure intuition of time,

our intuition of inner sense serving a dual role.

Since time

is the immediate determining or conditioning agent of inner

sense, all our experiences are ordered by us in time, that
is,

they take place in time.

Hence,

if the intellect and

sensibility are to be related at all, Kant believes, they
must be related by means of our pure temporal intuition.

40

Ibid
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addition, the a priori particular^ of
time fills the
conditions of being both a priori and sensuous.

Thus,

concepts are imagined, connected, and related
in time.

In so

c-oing the intellect visualizes concepts
in some temporal

relation and thereby relates them.
To prove this contention, Kant has recourse
to showing
^ OVJ

»

through tine, the intellect affects sensibility.

The

intellect successively adds one to one, or considers time
as
a series of homogeneous moments.

This operation of numbering,

adding one to one, is the schema of the category of quantity,
the category as expressed in the form of time.
the intellect comprehends reality in time.

Analogously,

The content of the

real is that which remains in the midst of change.
way,

In this

the category of substance is operative in the intellect.

In the same way,

the category of causality is understood as

a connection in time,

etc.

Thus, Kant shows, with some

degree of difficulty, how time mediates between concept and
percept.

Kant sums up his argument as follows:

We find that the schema of each category contains and
makes capable of representation only a determination
of time.
The schema of magnitude is the generation
(synthesis) of time itself in the successive apprehension of an object.
The schema of quality is the
synthesis of sensation or perception with the representation of time; it is the filling of time. The
schema of relation is the connection of perceptions
with one another at all times according to a rule of
time determination.
Finally, the schema of modality
and of its categories in time itself is the correlate
of the determination whether and how an object belongs
in time.
The schema are thus nothing but a priori

Of.

S.

Korner, Kant (Middlesex, G. 3.

Ltd., I960), p. 30.

:

Penguin Books

determinations of time.
It is seen,

then,

^

2

that the schema of the pure concepts of

the understanding are the true and sole
conditions under

which these concepts relate two objects and so
possess
signif icance

.

"

In addition,

these concepts can have no

other possible employment than the empirical.
writes,

"They," Kant

"serve only to subordinate appearances to universal

rules of synthesis, and thus, to fit them for thoroughgoing

connections in one experience." 2

*''7

All our knowledge, therefore, must fall within the
bounds of possible experience.

The categories may be applied

only to the manifold of sensation as spatiotemporally ordered
by the mind prior to cognition.

This spatiotemporally

ordered manifold constitutes the bounds within which the

categories are applicable.
4.

Phenomena and .Science.
As has been indicated, we cannot transcend our experience

and have a priori knowledge of the supersensible.

Such a

knowledge would be a knowledge of things-in-themselves

,

of

things as they are apart from their mode of presentation,

apart from our necessary spatiotemporalizing of them.

Thus,

things-in-themselves cannot be perceived by the senses; only

30

the way they appear to consciousness
is knowable.
Moreover,
they cannot be intuited by the
intellect for there is no

intellectual intuition.

It is seen,

then, that if we apply

any of the categories to a thing-in-itself

,

we cannot justify

their application.
We can

however

>

,

think such a thing-in-itself 48
.

We

may speak of it as that which lies outside of
sense
perception, that which is non-spatiotemporal

.

No category,

however, may be applied to it, because we have no
means of

knowing if anything corresponding to it exists.

We could,

for example, never know whether anything existed
corresponding
to the notion of substance if sense-perception did
not

furnish us with a case in which the category can be applied.
However, we have no perception of a thing-in-itself.

The

thing-in-itself, then, is a limiting concept, it presents
a limit to knowledge.

Only the phenomenal, the world of

appearances, is intelligible to man.

What lies beyond it,

the noumenal, lies forever beyond the reach of human knowledge.
As such,

necessary

a

it follows that we cannot have universal and

priori knowledge of anything non-perceivable.

Hence, we cannot have a metaphysics that transcends experience,
a metaphysics of the noumenal realm.

Knowledge of God, free

will, and immortality lies outside the realm of possible

objective knowledge, outside the world of phenomena.
Kant believes he has shown that mathematics and geometry

48

See Kant's section on the "Refutation of Idealism,"

CPR, p. 244.
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owe their necessity to our pure
Intuitions of space and time.
Specifically, geometry is thought to be
based on the a priori

form of space and arithmetic on the
notion or number which
expresses a priori our pure intuition of
time.
In addition,
natural science is seen to rest upon the
categories.
Cause
and effect, reciprocity, substance and
quality,
etc.,

the

judgements of science, are given a base not in
senseperception, but
r
•»

e can

in-

the mind.

thus have universal and necessary knowledge in

mathematics and in physics, but it is a knowlege of phenomena
only, knowledge only of the form and arrangement of
phenomena.

Causal laws as synthetic a priori judgements bear fruit as
applied to the realm of possible experience, the realm of

spatiotemporally preconditioned sensation.

The validity of

science is believed restored from Hume's devastating attacks,
but its application must be confined within the conditioned

phenomenal world.

Thus, scientific thought can again

penetrate our passing sensations to a common objective world
of substances in interaction, but this world is a world as
it appears to human minds and not

are in themselves.

a

world of things as they

32
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In Retrospect

What has here been presented is a brief
exposition of
Kant's transcendental method and his philosophical

beliefs.

This discussion has proceeded as an account of
Kant's

philosophy which is pertinent to the matter at hand,
namely,
the development of neo-Kantian thought and the
philosophy of

language in general.

The sections on the "Analogies

"Antinomies

and the 'Transcendental Dialectic?' were omitted as irrelevant
to

the development of a context from which the main thesis
of

this paper may proceed.
No matter what one's philosophical beliefs may be, it

must be agreed that Kant's contribution to philosophy was

major one.

a

To Kant, what reality is to the inquirer depends

upon the categories of thought inherent in the inquiring
mind.

What exists apart from these mental operations is

forever hidden from cognition.

Reality, then, is arranged or

manipulated by man's thought processes so that what he may
know relies solely upon what he may think.

Man shapes and

forms the barest real according to his methods of knowing.

Metaphorically speaking, his mind casts mental beams of light
toward the darkness of unknown reality.

illuminates a circle of inquiry.

As such,

the mind

However, what is observed

is as much a function of the illuminating light as it is a

function of the illuminated.

The sheer power of these ideas

secure Kant's position as a philosopher of the first order.
However, Kant's transcendental system, the system by

which he believes the previous ideas are rendered explicit,

,"
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is by no means straightforward
or consistently presented.

fact, many believe

in

much of his philosophy is so obscure
as

to be almost unintelligible.

The intricate workings of his

system have, since its inception, been
severely criticized by
knowledgeable men of all disciplines.
No doubt

>

some of Kant's obscurities can be understood

in terms of the revolutionary nature
of his thought.

Perhaps

this explains why his terminology and general
manner of

presentation is difficult to master.

Once, however, a clear

meaning is abstracted from Kantian language

— and

this is

often a very difficult task--there are many who, although

agreeing with Kant in principle, are dissatisfied with the
internal workings of his system.

There are others, Whitehead"’ 0

and Russell 51 for example, who are completely at odds with

the basic tenets of his belief.

Kant's critics were and are quite numerous.

criticisms will be brought forward shortly.

Some of these

For the present,

however, suffice it to say these criticisms did not force the
total abandonment of the Kantian first principles.

His basic

beliefs proved themselves to be important philosophical

discoveries.

49

These criticisms served only as impetus for his
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followers to improve upon his system.

Kant's successors,

called neo-Kantians, hoped to profit by
Kant's mistakes and
at the same time preserve the basic
principles of his
"

Copern i can Revolution.

"

Such a view is stated by the neo-

Kantian H. U. Cassirer as fellows:

... I also happen to hold what at present is a most
unfashionable opinion, namely, that the errors
committed by the great philosophers are, generally
speaking, not only more interesting but more fruitful
than the truths propounded by lesser men. 52
The task set before the followers of Kant was, then,
to

present the Kantian hypothesis as a consistent and coherent
whole.

While these men endeavored to achieve this goal,

philosophy witnessed the birth of a new philosophical pursuit,
namely, linguistic philosophy or the philosophy of language.

Neo-Kant ians soon found that the key to the remaking of Kant's

philosophy lay in the orinciples of linguistic philosophy.
Let us,

then, embark upon an investigation of how criticisms

of the Kantian system resulted in its reformulation by neo-

Kantians and analytic philosophers in regard to the philosophy
of language.

52

H. W. Cassirer, Kant's First Critique (London: George
Allen and Unwin Ltd. and Mew York: The Macmillan Co., 195^)
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PART TWO

CRITICISM OF KANT AND NEO-KANTIAN THOUGHT

II.»

CRITICISM OF KANT AND
.

A.

1.

IIEP- KANTIAN

THOUGHT

Space and Time

Geometry.

Having outlined the main points of
Kant's philosophy, I
shall now turn to the exposition of some
of the criticism his
contention has engendered. Thus, with an eye
toward subsequent
neo-Kan tian reformulations of the Kantian
hypothesis, let us
proceed with shedding some light on some of the
difficulties
both inherent in and productive of Kant's
philosophy.
As has been pointed out, Kant placed great
importance in
his belief that the certainty of geometry is
constituted by

our pure intuition of space.

In fact,

unless we possess such

a pure intuition, geometry would be impossible.

day,

In Kant's

the only geometry known was Euclidian geometry.

believed to be true of the empirical world.

1

It was

Indeed, Kant's

system can be seen as directed toward the conservation of this
belief; for he hoped his philosophy would successfully

account for its certainty in itself and its application.
Kant died just twenty years before Hiemann developed the

first non-Euclidian geometry.

1

Unfortunately for Kant, the

It should be stressed that for Kant space means Euclidian
space, and in particular, Euclidian geometry.
For an account
of this see Gottfried Martin, Kant's Metaphysics and Theory of
Science (Manchester, G. B. Manchester Press, 19^1), p. 4o.
:

2
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development of modern mathematics and
of modern mathematical
theory casts grave doubts upon
his assumptions in regard to
geometry.
Of this, one of his commentators
has written the
following:

According to the modern view, mathematics
now aims at
so high a degree of generality and
abstractness
that
it has ceased to have any essential
connection with
quantity, and a fortiori with space. The
result is
that formal logi c, mathematical theory,
and pure
mathematics, are all merged into an indivisible
whole;
and this whole i s described as pursuing
an analytical’
method
.

In other words,

modern mathematics and geometry owe their

certainty not to a pure intuition of space, but to
their being
analytic systems which proceed solely by deductive
processes
from fixed axioms and postulates. Hence, one does
not need a

pure spatial intuition to explain such certainty.

This

development taken alone does not disprove the Kantian hypothesis
for perhaps intuition of space can explain the Euclidian

geometry of Kant’s contemporaries, but when understood in the
light of modern physics grave difficulties arise.

Modern relativity physics has provided for some startling

discoveries affecting cosmological theories of space and
time.

In

reference to Kantian philosophy, its most pertinent

development was in the realm of geometry.

Relativity physics

has overthrown the old belief that Euclidian geometry is the

sole geometry that is true of the world.

In its place has

been postulated the theory of what Reichenbach calls, "the

2

H. J. Pa ton, Kant’s Metaphysics of Experience (London:
Allen and Unwin Ltd., and New York: Macmillan and Go., 1951),

p.

155.

.

.

5
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relativity of geometries." 3

He states the following:

The theory of relativity shows that
are neither ideal objects nor formal space and time
forms of order
necessary for the human mind.**'
In the same vein, Paton writes the
followinr:

Modern theory ... denies that any one kind
of
space is more fundamental than any other.
Above
all
it denies that Euclidian space is more
real or
fundamental than any other.
,

Thus, there are as many "spaces" as there are
geometries.

It

is not surprising that Einstein chose a
non-Buclidian space
in which to describe certain spatial relationships.

It is now

seen that the world must no longer fit a geometry, but
there
is a question as to what geometry fits a certain
empirical

situation
That,

then, are the implications for Kantianism?

It is

understood that there are no longer any grounds for assuming
that Euclidian geometry is true of the world, nor can one

maintain that the certainty of geometry must depend upon a
pure intuition of space.

But what of visualization'

If

there is a complete relativity of geometry and one geometry
is as good as

the next, why not assume Euclidian geometry as

being true of the world of experience; for it is the only

geometry capable of being visualized.

a
v Eor

an enlightening discussion of this theory see Hans
Reichenbach, The Philosophy of Space and Time (New York: Dover,
1958), p. 30f.
h,

Hans Reichenbach, "Philosophical Significance of the
Theory of Relativity," Headim^s in the Philosophy of Science
edited by Philip Wiener (New York: Scribner's and Sons, 1953),
p. 68
,

3 Paton

,

op. cit

.

p.

161.
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This view, however, is seen to
include a faulty premise.
It is now widely held that
non-Euclid ian geometry can be and
is visualized.

Many geometers believe that they can do
this.

Many la ymen, in fact, perceive "non-Euclid
ianly” every day. 6
It is thus believed that a non-Euclid
ian geometry can be

visualized with practice.

17

,f

e

have now no other choice but

to agree with Reichenbach when he states:

"There is no

defense of Kantianism."^
If Kant's theory is

to be maintained in a modern forn^

we

should have to hold that there must be as many pure Intuitions
of space as there are geometries; that there must be

pure

intuitions of space-time in the light of which all different

geometries are intelligible.

This, however,

far from Kant's original intentions.

seems to stray

Furthermore, it is

supposed that such a doctrine, in the hands of a competent

scientist, can be reduced to meaninglessness.

Kant's purpose

was to justify and account for the strange pervasiveness and

comprehensiveness of Euclidian geometry.

In this context,

perhaps Kant's greatest genius can be found in his ability to

recognize the problem of explaining this pervasiveness.
A

Take, for example, one's perception of on-coming automobiles as viewed in a curved side-view mirror. After one
becomes acclimated to the mirror's "distortions," it is simple
to judge spatial relations.

?The argument for visualization is stronger than 1 have
Nevertheless, Reichenbach makes quick work of
here indicated.
it in The Philosophy of Space and Time p. 44f.
,

®Hans Reichenbach, "Philosophical Significance of the
Theory of Relativity," Readings in the Philosophy of Science
p.

66.

.
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As has been seen, Kant’s
explanation of space and

geometry is rendered practically untenable
in the light of
the recent developments in physics and
mathematics.
The

problem posed to Kant's followers was then to
explain the

preeminence of euclidian geometry in perception and
thought
without recourse to a priori intuitions. Why is it,
for

example, objects are arranged by us in a Euclidian fashion?

Why do we find non-Euclid ian geometry so difficult to
conceive?

particular

It has been pointed out by many, Frank^ in
,

that we are trained solely in Euclidian geometry

in schools.

It is to be noticed, however,

that those without

formal training have the same difficulty of visualization.

There clearly must be an overall factor underlying spatial

perception and thought that provides for the Dervasiveness
of Euclidian geometry.

Neo-Kantians and others soon found

that the "condi tioning power" of the edifice of language could

be this sought after factor.

This, however, will be discussed

in a subsequent chapter.

2.

Space-Time

.

In the section on the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant

holds that space and time are the forms by which the manifold,
of sense becomes known to us.

Moreover, it is believed that

space by itself and time by itself are the conditioning agents

^Philipp Frank, Philosophy of Science (Englewood Cliffs,
N.

J.: Prentiss-Hall

,

1958)

,

p.

52

.

^
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of such sensual knowledge. 10

At the same time, Kant maintains

that space is the form of outer experience
and time is the
form of inner experience.
Of this Paton remarks:
If
a e
nd tin1e 3re t0 serve Kant’s purposes they
uF 2to ?be
ought
universal and necessary conditions of
"" i^tven to sense.
It can hardly be maintained chat t^ant has shown space to be such a
condition.
•.Space is said to be the condition of
outer experience and of outer intuition. This
assertion definitely restricts or limits the exnerience
of which space is said to be the limit.

~~

In addition,

Paton points out that,

"similar difficulties

might be raised in rsgard to time." 12
inner sense only

Time is the form of

that is, of the intuition of ourselves and

,

of our inner states,

it,

therefore, cannot be a determinant

of outer experience.

How are we to render Kant’s account of space and time

consistent in the light of Paton's arguments?

There are

places where Kant does not seem wholly unaware of this
difficulty.

For example;

Time and space are, therefore, two sources of
knowledge from which bodies of a priori synthetic
knowledge can be derived. Time and space, taken
together, are the pure forms of all sensible
intuition and so are what make synthetic a priori
propositions possible.
It seems,

for a consistent Kantian doctrine we must

then,

^Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Season translated by
Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and Co., 1929), p. 66.
(Hereafter referred to as CPR.
,

^Ipaton, op. clt .. p. 146.
•^ Ibld

13 era

,

.

.

p.

p.

148.

80.
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understand space and time as conditions
of all objects given
to sense and must conclude that
neither space by itself or
time by itself is a sufficient condition
for all sensual

knowledge; that only their concatenation,
space- time, can
serve this function. Paton reaches a
similar conclusion:
o make lant's doctrine satisfactory we
must
recognize that space and time are ultimately
bound
up togetner, and that space is the mediate
condition of inner, as well as the immediate
condition of outer, experience. 14
1

Analogously, time is considered the mediate condition
of
outer experience and the immediate condition of inner
sense.
fhus,

within the Kantian system, togetherness of space and

time can be understood in terms of their mediate and immediate

powers of conditioning or ordering the manifold of sensation.
j.his

in terpre ta t ion can be seen to vary somewhat from Kant's

exposition.

However,

it is this idea of the togetherness of

space and time which served as a point of departure for

improvements upon the Kantian system.
Bertrand Russell, one of Kant's most outspoken critics,
finds great fault with the Transcendental Aesthetic.

Such a

view of space and time, he believes, is not consistent with
the assumptions of not only relativity physics, but all

physics.

As such,

utility.

Assuming, as Kant does, that percepts are caused by

the Kantian view is seen to be lacking in

things-in-themselves

,

Russell presents us with the following

argument

Ik

Paton, op. cit ., p. 99.

,
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If we adopt the view, which
is taken for errant
physics, that our percepts have
external causes which
ftre, in some sense,
material, we are led to thp
conclusion that all the actual qualities w,
n
ln thei r unperoalvaS ZZtl
nut that
but
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there is a certain
,
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Thus, says Russell:
e .ir.ve, on this view, two spaces,
one subjective and
one oojective one known in experience and
one merely
inferred.
But there is no difference in this respect
oetween space and other aspects of perception,
such
as colors and sounds.
All alike, in their subjective
forms, are known empirically; all alike, in
their
oo jective f orms are inferred by means of a
maxim as
to causation.
There is no reason whatever for regarding our knowledge of space as in any way different
from
our knowledge of color and sound and smell. 16
,

,

With regards to time, he continues:
if we adhere to the belief in unperceived causes
of percepts, the objective time must be identical with
the subjective time.
take for example such a case
as the following: You hear a man speak, you answer him
and he hears you.
His speaking, and his hearing of
your reply, are both, so far as you are concerned, in
the unperceived world; and in that world the former
precedes the latter. Moreover, his speaking precedes
your hearing in the objective world of physics; your
hearing precedes your reply in the subjective world of
percepts; and your reply precedes his hearing in the
objective world of physics. It is clear that the
relation "precedes" must be the same in all these
.

.

.

.

.

.

^Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New
York: 3imon and Schuster 1945)
p. 717
,

l 6 Ibid.

,

.
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propositions. While, therefore, there is
an important
sense in which perceptual space is
subjective there ‘i*
no sense in which perceptual time is
subjective. 1?
believe Russell has here presented a very
cogent
argument. Why should we regard our knowledge
I

of space, on

the perceptual level, any differently from
our knowledge of

smell and taste?

Furthermore, how, according to this argument,

may we say that perceptual time is subjective?

Yet, Russell

does not seem to be aware of the problem that Kant
was trying
so eagerly to solve; namely, how can one account
for the

peculiar pervasiveness of space and time in perception and
conception?

Perhaps Russell does not think this to be a

problem at all.

Nevertheless, there is much substance to his

argument.

Perhaps Bussell’s most telling criticism attacks the

Kantian theory as it stands.

Of the metaphysical arguments

concerning space and time he says:
The image which arises in one's mind is that of a
cloak-room attendant who hangs different cloaks on
different pegs; the pegs must already exist, but the
attendant's subjectivity arranges the coats.
There is here, as throughout Kant's theory of the
subjectivity of space and time, a difficulty which
he seems to have never felt. What induces me to
arrange objects of perception as I do rather than
otherwise? Why, for instance, do I always see
people's eyes above their mouths and not below them?18
.

.

.

Thus, Kant's arguments tell us that objects of perception

must be arranged spatiotemporally

17 Ibid.
18 Ibid

.

.

p.

714.

,

but this does not explain

why certain objects are spatially
related to other objects
the way they are.
Russell continues,
Kant holds that the mind orders the
raw
sensation, but never thinks it necessary material of
to say 'why
it orders as it does and not otherwise* i-9

Kant's system, then, does not explain the
positioning of
particulars (particular objects) in space and time.
Clearly
there is nothing in the matter of sensation,
in things-inthemselves, which corresponds to the spatial
arrangement of
objects oi perception. This can be seen as only a
restatement
of the Leibnizian position which Kant believes he
has dis-

proved in his metaphysical exposition of space and time.
'^hat

there,

is

then,

in the form of sensation,

in space as a

pure intuition, which can explain this phenomenon?

Clearly,

if Kant's system is to be consistent, one must account
for

the positioning of particulars in space and time.

Furthermore,

it must be pointed out why particular objects are positioned

as they are

— relative

to other objects--and not otherwise.

Such an endeavor must admit amendments to the Kantian system,

must recognize something more basic than pure space and pure
time as ordering agents or forms of sensation and at the same

time account for Kantian space and time.

Some modern

philosophers concerned with the problem believe that language
fulfills the role of explaining the peculiar positioning of

particulars and can be seen as underlying Kantian space and
An investigation of this claim will be attempted in the

time.

following chapters.

19

Ibid.

.
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5.

For Kant,

The Understanding

the understanding is actively engaged
in

synthesizing and organizing objects of
experience.

It does

this by way of a set of rules which
act as criteria for all
its operations.
These rules are called categories or pure

concepts of the understanding.

Kant leads us to believe that

these categories apply only to experienced
objects; objects
of possible human experience which have
been pre-spatio-

temporalized by sensibility.

As such, the categories do not

apply to things in themselves; things outside possible
human
experience.

Thus, there is no justification of applying the

categories to things outside of the manifold of sensibility.
However, Kant, at the same time, holds that things-in-thernselves

are the causes of sensation.

If such a statement is true then

the category of cause may be applied to things-in-themselves
/e

are thus left with the contradictory conclusion that

things-in-themselves are experienced, since categories may
only apply to objects of experience.

This seemingly

inconsistent consequence of the Kantian hypothesis has its
roots in certain statements made by the nineteenth century

philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer.

He maintained that we cannot

properly speak of things-in-themselves or

a

thing- in-itself,

since in so doing we seem to apply the category of plurality
or of unity to that which, according to Kant, cannot come

under any category.

Agreeing with Schopenhauer, Bertrand

Russell says the following:

46
-this inconsistency is not
an accidental oversight*
°
it is an essential part of
[Kant's] system. 20

*

However, there is some doubt as to the
cogency of
Schopenhauer's argument. The concept of a
thing-in-itself
is consistent if it is understood
as a mere negation of what
is known as an object of perception.
In this
sense,

the

concept of noumenon carries with it no
metaphysical commitments.
Accordingly, it is not necessary that we should
know
instances of a negation of a concept in order to
speak in

terms

ol

it.

In this connection,

It is

Korner believes:

.
.
possible to reconstruct the critique in
such a way that the concept of a noumena is in
fact
used only as a negative concept. 21
.

Nevertheless, he adds:
But it would be a mistake to regard such reconstruction
as a mere interpretation of Kant's philosophy .22
Thus, the case for Schopenhauer's criticism does not seem
as certain as Hussell would have us believe.

However, as

Korner points out, we cannot concede that Kant's critique,
as it is presented, is free and clear of this kind of

inconsistency
an

If we agree with Kant that a noumena is simply

.

"un-thing" but at the same time affects our senses, the

concept of a noumena is no longer merely negative.

A

reconstruction of the concept of a noumena, although possible,
would not be strictly Kantian.

20

Ibld

.

.

p.

2

^S. Korner,
I960), p. 94.
2^

Ibid

.

.

p.
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importance one may attach to
Schopenhauer’s criticism, we
cannot deny that there is some
question as to Kant's theory
of noumena as it is presented.

Before turning to further criticisms
engendered by the
Kantian theory of the understanding,
it might behoove us to
consider two assumptions Korner finds
basic to Kant's concept
of the categories.
Firstly, it is observed that Kant assumed
it is possible
to list logical forms of thought.
No doubt he was led to
this belief by his complete acceptance of
Aristotelian logic.
As such, he believed Aristotelian logic
to be a science which
is

"closed and completed

,i2
.

3

The second assumption is his inherent belief
that no new
a priori concepts can be formed which would unify
and

synthesize presentations in a new way.

This belief can be

seen to rest upon Kant's dependence on Newtonian physics.

Newton is regarded as having developed the sole method of

scientific enquiry.

As such,

Kant can envision no other

scientific categories of thought.
In the light of modern science and modern logic these

assumptions have been the target for a great amount of
criticism.

Modern logic has shown that there are many more

and different forms of judgement than Kant assumed.

Contemporary logicians have totally abandoned the Aristotelian
syllogism end replaced it with a much more sophisticated

23 CPH.

p.

17.

.
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system recognizing many forms of inference.

Regarding

physics, one now finds many new scientific
categories and
concepts.
For example, Korner mentions Whitehead's
concept
of four dimensional space and four dimensional
events.

He

states

Here is a concept which is to unify presentations
in
the manner exemplified in those objective empirical
judgements which are found in relativity physics. 24
One could cite many similar examples of new and different

scientific categories of thought for which Kant cannot account.
In what sense,

then, can Kant have given us a complete

list of all possible categories of judgement?

Perhaps, it

might be thought, his list of categories was sufficient to
explain all judgements of his day.

However, even if this was

possible, Kant does not seem to be aware of the shortcomings
of his own interpretation of Aristotelian logic.

Of this

Korner says the following:
[Kant believed] ... to list all the possible logical
forms of objective empirical judgement is a possible
task, which is highly doubtful.
Indeed, his own list
is mistaken.
He considers, for example, that there
is only one form of hypothetical "if-then" judgement;
we now know, as indeed the Stoics knew, that hypothetical judgements have a grammatical similarity
which disguises fundamental logical differences
amongst them. 25
Thus,

there is some doubt as to not only the validity of

Aristotelian logic, but also Kant's interpretation of

ok

.

'Korner,

25 Ibid

.

,

op.

p . 50

cit

.

.
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In addition, Kant may be seen
to have disclosed a very

biased list of judgements.

His ideal of discovering all

categories of thought by which the manifold of
sensation
transformed into a synthetic unity is too greatly

is

slanted

toward only one mode of mental endeavor; namely,
the realm
of science.
Of this, Ernst Cassirer makes the following

comment:
[Kant believed his analysis]
can disclose the
conditions on which all knowledge of being and the
pure concept of being depend. But the object which
transcendental analytic thus places before us is
the correlate of the synthetic unity of the understanding, an object determined by purely logical
attributes. Hence, it does not characterize all
objectivity as such, but only that form of objective
necessity which can be apprehended and described by
the basic concepts of science.
When in the
course of the three critiques Kant proceeds to
develop the true "system of pure reason," he himself
found this objectivity too narrow.
In his idealistic
view, mathematics and physics do not exhaust all
reality, because they are far from encompassing all
the workings of the human spirit in its creative
spontaneity .26
.

.

.

.

.

.

Thus, Cassirer feels that Kant has failed to account for a

great number of synthesizing acts by which sensory data may
be objectified.

By confining himself to an examination of

the principles exhibited by Newtonian physics, Kant was led
to underestimate,

if not miss totally,

other significant

structures present and effective within common experience.
Instead of restricting his attention to the superstructure of
science, Cassirer believes that Kant should have tried to

reveal categories of the various other domains of human

2

^Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms Vol.
trans. by Ralph Manheim (New Haven Yale University Press,
.

:

1953),

p.

75.

I,
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expression and representation in which
perceptions appear as
so many realms of object ivation
It appears that we are forced
to agree with Cassirer.
In no sense can we say that
Kant has supplied us with forms

of thought comprising all human
conceptual activity. Indeed,
the categories pertinent to art,
literature and language, to
name a few, are not mentioned by Kant.
However, we must also
admit that even at the scientific and
mathematical level,

where Kant concentrated the bulk of his
attention, his list
of categories is still by no means complete.
It has been suggested,

by Paton 27 for example, that

perhaps Kant's ideal is itself impossible, that one
cannot

dislodge from all forms of human endeavor, all forms of
thought
pertinent to those endeavors.

We shall not be concerned here

with deciding whether or not Paton is correct in this view.
But we shall be concerned with the following question: if it
is possible to discover these forms of thought where should

one look?

Furthermore, if these categories of thought are

discoverable in principle, why should we think according to
these rules and not any others?
We have here stumbled upon a problem which Kant does not
seem to sense the importance of; namely, why are we all in

possession of certain categories and no others?

Of this,

Kant says the following:
This peculiarity of the understanding, that can
produce a priori unity of apperception solely by

27 Paton,

op. clt ..

p.

211.
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Thus, Kant believes that the
problem is suoh that no further
explanation of the categories is needed,
or for that matter,
possible.
However, Paton disagrees:

Kant’s procedure seems to me consistent,
but it does
not really mee t with the difficulties
I have raised
Why our admittedly a priori knowledge
of the
P araROe ® should require explanation, while
nnr «amff?
S? 8 pr * ori
it 6d
knowledge of the forms of
w
iJ require no
thought should
explanation .29
We have already seen that the Kantian
categories are in many
ways incomplete.
Moreover, there is still the problem of
deciding where to look for these categories. There
clearly

must be some explanation, some reason why we
think according
to certain forms of thought and not others.

If we can find

such an explanation perhaps we may be able to enlarge
and

refine the list of Kantian categories.
Modern anthropology has shown that to a large extent

diverse cultures produce diverse patterns of thought.

For this

reason, many neo-Kan tians and modern philosophers in general

have sought to relate categories of thought with culture.

Because cultures express themselves through the medium of
language, language is found to contain the key to the conceptual

system of a particular culture.

Culture and language, then are

seen to supply these sought after categories.

28 CPK.
2

p.

161.

9Paton, op. cit .. p. 565
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connection between culture, language,
and the categories will
be investigated in what follows.

.
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C.

1.

Modern Meo-Kantians

Introduction

:

Language and Culture

.

The criticisms of the Kantian
system that I have here
briefly developed must be understood
as a fragmentary account
of a vast area of philosophical
criticism.
Moreover, the
foregoing criticisms have been pre-selected
because of their

relevance to the reformulation of the
Kantian doctrine by
those scholars called modern neo-Kantians
dhe

terra

"neo-Kan tian " is somewhat vague, for it is

freely applied to a whole gamut of philosophers.

For example,

the terra is applied to those who interpret
Kant through the

philosophy of Hegel.

At the same time, it is also applied to

a class of nineteenth century philosophers who
limited

philosophy to the analysis of states of consciousness.
in lieu of

However,

effective criticism of the Kantian system, it was

natural that philosophers should again take up the problem of
knowledge, to which Kant had given such careful and sober

attention, and subject the various intellectual tendencies of
the age to critical examination.

the cry:

"Back to Kant."

In 1865>

0.

Liebmann^^ raised

The critical philosophy, then,

became the rallying point for all those who opposed the methods
of the Hegelians and the progress of materialism, as well as

for those who distrusted metaphysics altogether.

During the early part of the ti^entieth century, this

Frank Thillv, A History of Philosophy (New York: Henry
Holt and Co., 1927), p. ^93.
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movement, called the neo-Kantian movement 31
grew to large
proportions.
The members of this group emphasized
the need
,

of epistemological investigations,
some even regarding the

philological study of Kant’s writings, especially
the Critique
3
^
o f Jure Reason
However, the specific doctrines
.

,

of those

in this movement varied greatly.
In recent years,

of neo-Kantians
in

.

however, there has emerged another class

These philosophers differed from the others

recognizing language as the key factor in rendering

Kantian philosophy consistent in the light of modern
criticism.

Briefly

,

their contention is that language may be seen as the

means by which the sensory manifold is objectified for thought.
As such,

language presents a partially completed list of the

Kantian categories and is seen to underly and explain the
Kantian pure intuitions of space and time.
The spokesman of this movement is generally considered
to be Ernst Cassirer.

As previously discussed, Cassirer

generally accepts the Kantian methodology but believes that
Kant failed to account for a great variety of synthesizing
acts by which sensory data is objectified
to be read as experience.

— spelled

In other words,

out in order

Cassirer denies that

Kant has presented us with a completed list of the categories

32

See, for example, H. Vaihinger, The Philosophy of
"As-If ” trans. by C. K. Ogden (London: Kegan Paul, Trench,
Tubner and Co., Ltd., and New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.,
1924 ).
.
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and haS ade ^ uate1
^

the process of perception.^

He

believes that Kant did not realize
the full range of
application for which his method could
bear fruit. As such,
he demands an extension of Kant's
critical method to domains
of reality other than those structured
by Newtonian
physics.

Cassirer

general doctrine states that the function
of
language is not to copy reality but to symbolize
it.
A

language is

a

*

s

system of categorical devices which give
form

to the world.

As such, any attempt to distinguish
between

language and the world is mistaken.^ 4

To ask what reality is

apart from these forms inherent in language is
irrelevant.
Every form of existence has its source in some
peculiar way
of seeing,

some intellectual formulation

of meaning.
"

and some intuition

Cassirer holds, moreover, that there are several

languages "35 or "perspectives" each with its own "reality."

Inese are, roughly, the world of common sense, the world
of

myth and art, and the world of science.
But how does one go about establishing Cassirer's claim

that language both shapes the world and symbolizes it?

If

we cannot "see" the world except through language, there is

no sense in offering empirical evidence for such a view.

In

other words, the world we investigate is one already shaped

See the introduction to Ernst Cassirer's, The Philosophy
of Symbolic Forms trans. by Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1953).
,

3^ Ibid.
33

Ibld

.

,

p.

93f.

,

p.

107.
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by language.

There is no getting outside the limits
of

language to verify the fact empirically.
himself fully realized.

This point Cassirer

It is a necessary consequence of his

philosophical system that this should be so.
Cassirer's philosophy answered many of the questions
rdised jy critics of the Kantian system.

Since the form of

his philosophy prevented empirical proof for his claims,
many

critics, intoxicated with the positivism of the twentieth
century, found little value in Cassirer's beliefs.

However,

two linguists, Whorf and Sapir, independently arrived at much
the same beliefs as Cassirer held.

Their thesis was formulated

in such a manner as to be amenable to empirical proof.

fact,

In

their conclusions were arrived at through data

accumulated in linguistics and anthropology.

It is this

formulation of the relation between language and thought that
we shall, shortly, study,

2.

The Whorf-Sapir Hypothesis

.

With few exceptions, philosophers throughout the history
of philosophy uncritically accepted what may be called the

"copy" theory of language.

These philosophers firmly believed

that the relation of a word to the object it denotes, and the

relation of language in general to the world in general, was
one of representation or copying.

As such,

the function of

language was merely to faithfully reproduce the nature of the
world as it appeared to the observer
the world.
to objects.

— in

a sense, mirroring

Languages, then, differed only in the names given

Linguistic communication was conceived as an
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activity in which one is free and
untraimeled every language
being equally well fitted for the
communication of any and
all beliefs.
Thus, traditional philosophy
believed that
,

thinking is an obvious, straightforward
activity, the same
for all rational beings, of which
language is the straightforward medium of expression.
However, modern anthropology and linguistics
have shown
that there is no reason to assume that
language serves only
as a neutral medium which simply represents
experience.
In
fact,

it is believed that language presents the
mold in which

the content of experience is to be poured.

Language, then,

is no longer a mere representation of the experienced
world,

but is seen to be const! tuitive of experience in the
Kantian

sense of the term.

More than twenty years ago, Edward Sapir,

a noted linguist and anthropologist,

took the first steps in

explicitly formulating this new view of the role of language.
He maintained:

The relation between language and experience is often
misunderstood
Language is not merely a more or less
systematic inventory of the various items of experience
which seem relevant to the individual, as is so often
naively assumed, but is also a self-contained creative
symbolic organization which not only refers to
experience largely acquired without its help but
actually defines experience for us by reason of its
formal completeness and because of our conscious projection of its implicit expectations into the field of
experience. 3
.

,

f)

Perhaps a more explicit formulation of this doctrine proceeds

36

Edward Sapir, "Conceptual Categories of Primitive
Languages," Science No.
(1931)> p. 578*
.
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as follows:

Human beings do not live in the
objective world
or alone in the world of social
activitv
ar ? Jr
ti ® rstoo
^» but are very much at the mercy
.P
nf
of the particular language which
has become the medium
of expression for their society.
It is
liusion to imagine that one adjusts to quite an
society without
“ se ° f la ^guage and that
language is merely an
inciaental means of solving specific problems
of
01
an refle °tion.
The
fact
of
the
matter
!
?!
?
WOrld " iS t0 9 large ext6nt Unconsciously bu.lt up on the language habits
of the group. 37

^ ^

^

->apir

believed that a comparison of radically
different

languages would bring a realization of the full
force of his
contention. Unfortunately, Sapir died before he
had a chance
to complete his work.
It remained for another linguist,

Benjamin Lee Vhorf

,

to further develop Sapir's claim.

In a

series of scientific papers, which have since been
collected
into book form by John B. Carroll, 33 Whorf developed
the now
famous "Whorf-Sapir hypothesis."

exposition of all

f

The full and complete

horf's beliefs is nowhere expressed in one

concise hypothesis, the term "hypothesis" being somewhat of
a misnomer.

In fact,

many of Whorf

1

s

contentions are not

explicitly formulated but may only be seen as lying behind
the veil of some very eloquent rhetoric.

37

Edward Sapir, The Selected Writing of Edward Sapir
edited by D. G. Wand elbaura (University of California Press,
1949), p. 162.
.
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Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language. Thought, and Reality
edited by John B. Carroll (Boston: The Technology Press of M.
I. T. and New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959).
,
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Conveniently, Max Black 39 has extracted
ten propositions,
or theses, from Whorf’ s sometimes
exaggerated style
of

exposition.

These propositions,

I

believe, separate the wheat

from one chaff and present the main views of
Whorf in their

clearest form.

These are as follows:

(1) Languages embody "integrated fashions of
speaking"
background linguistic systems,” consisting of prescribed
modes of expressing thought and experience.

or

(2) A native speaker has a distinctive "conceptual
system" for "organizing experience," and (3) a distinctive
world view” concerning the universe and his relation to it.
(4) The background linguistic system partially determines
the associated conceptual system, and (5) partially determines
the associated world view.
(6) Reality consists of a "kaleidoscopic flux of
impressions
.

(7) The "facts" said to be perceived are a function of
the language in which they are expressed, and (8) the "nature
of the universe" is a function of the language in which it is
stated
(9) Grammar does not reflect reality, but varies
arbitrarily with language.

(10) Logic does not reflect reality, but varies arbitrarily
with language.

It would seem, then,

that language works in much the

same way as the Kantian pure intuitions and pure concepts of
the understanding.

Whorf believes, as William James did,

that the substratum of experience consists of a blooming,

buzzing world of kaleidoscopic impressions.

However, it is

language which gives form to this manifold, which presents

39

Max Black, Models and Metaphors (Ithaca, N. Y.:
Cornell University Press, 19&2), p. 244.

t

:

.
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the framework into which reality
is to be fitted.
states

Whorf

segmentation of nature is an aspect of
grammar
We
cut up ana organize the spread and
flow of events
largely because, We are parties in
an agreement to do so, not because nature
itself is segmented
in exact ay that way for all to see.
Languages differ
n not on^y in how they build
their sentences but also
in how they break down nature to
secure the elements
to out in those sentences. *K)
And again:

The why of understanding may remain for a
long time
mysterious, out the how of logic of understanding—
its background of laws of regularity— is
discoverable,
it is the gramma tioal background of
our mother tongue
which includes not only our way of constructing
propositions, but the way we dissect nature into
objects and entities to construct propositions about.
The power of Whorf' s claim is readily apparent.

style

i

s

as stimulating as his ideas themselves.

His

No doubt,

even an extremely dull reader would be stimulated by his

lively presentation.

Whorf s exposition

is literally charged

with a novelty and originality rarely found in philosophy.
However, although Whorf endeavors to supply proof for all
his contentions, there is much in what he says that remains

unsupported and indeed, some that is tainted with the
mystical.

To clarify and investigate Whorf'

s

claim, it would,

perhaps, behoove us further to break down his hypothesis into
two doctrines, namely, linguistic relativity and linguistic

determinism.

4l

Whorf

,

op

Ibid

.

p.

.

.

ci

239

.

.

p.

24o.
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Linguistic relativity is Whorf's
belief that each
language embodies a particular
world view or "Weltanschauung.
As such, the speakers of a
language are partners
to an

agreement to perceive and think of
the world in a certain
way not the only possible way.
Experience can be structured

m

a certain way,

or to use Kantian language, the
manifold

of sensation can be unified in
various ways, by different

languages which operate within these
structures.

Linguistic determinism expresses Whorf's
belief that the
language of a speaker is the principle
determinant of his
thought.

Language not only embodies a world view but
also
perpetuates this view. A particular language,
then,

determines the thought of its speakers.
It is doubtful that Whorf was a serious
student of Kant.
In all his essays there is not one reference
to Kant or to

his critique.

ihere is, however, a great amount of

parallelism between their hypotheses.

As Whorf was not a

formal philosopher, the term neo-Kantian being somewhat ill
fitting, it remains for us to deduce the effect of Whorf's

proposals upon our interpretation of neo-Kantian philosophy
if his doctrines are taken seriously.
In the realm of sensation, Kant believed that we have a

pure intuition of space and time.

belief were previously noted.

The reasons for this

It has,

however, come to our

attention that such a doctrine is no longer tenable in the
light of modern physics and mathematics.

In addition,

’

r

horf

and others have found cultures of people that do not have the

.

:
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same conceptions of time and space
to which Kant accords
universality in all human intuition.
Of this, Whorf says
the following:
find it gratuitous to assume that a
Hopi [North
American Indian] who knows only the Hopi
language and
the cultural ideas of his own society
has thfslme
notions, often supposed to be intuitions
of time and
a
haVe
that are generally assumed' to
I

be

Sniversal%

^

horf believes there are many ways to
intuit space and time.
In fact, there are as many different
intuitions of space and
time as there are different languages and
cultures.
He

1

f

states
I find iL gratuitous to assume that
Hopi thinking
contains any such notion as the supposed intuitively
felt flowing of [Newtonian] "time," or that the
intuition of a Hopi gives him this as one of its data.
Just as it is possible to have any number of geometries other than the Euclidean which give an
equally perfect account of space configurations, so
it is possible to have descriptions of the universe,
all equally valid, that do not contain our familiar
contrasts of time and space.
Thus, the Hopi
language and culture conceals a "metaphysics," such
as our so-called naive view of space and time does. ^3
.

Thus,

.

.

the language of a culture embodies a metaphysics which,

in turn,

responsible for a particular intuition of space

is

and time.

There is, then, a relativity of space-time

intuitions behind which lurks the metaphysics inherent in

languages
Language, for Whorf, works much in the same way as pure

intuitions do in the Kantian transcendental system.

42

Ibid

.
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.
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Reality
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is seen as a "kaleidoscopic
flux of

impressions"^ similar

to the unformed manifold of
sensation.

Such a flux of

impressions represents the bare
substratum of experience. To
-ant, our pure intuitions of
space and time unify this flux
or manifold spatiotemporally to
make it amenable to experience
'-s
such, the intuitions of space and
time constitute
the form

into which the given material
manifold must fit in order for
it to be experienced by human
beings.
Analogously, Whorf
believes that this manifold or flux must
be given form to be
experienced coherently.
However, relating to Kantian

sensibility, Whorf has found that different
cultures have
diverse "intuition^ of space and time. This
relativity of
spa tio temporal intuitions points to a more
basic formal

element in experience than Kant had envisioned, which
may
boast a universality in all cultures.
believes, consists of language.

This element, Whorf

The covert features of a

language are seen to produce an intuitive metaphysics
responsible for the formal patterned aspects of experience.
As such, languages operate upon r-aslitj

,

patterning and

structuring the barest elements of sensation into an
intelligible system.
'

T

He states:

e cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and
describe significances as we do, largely because we
are parties to an agreement to organize it in this
way an agreement which holds throughout our speech
community and is codified in the patterns of our
language.
The agreement is, of course, an implicit
and unstated one, BUT ITS TERMS ARE ABSOLUTELY

—

44

Ibid

.

,

p.

213.
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™w

A
Y
e cannot talk at all except
by
?
?h?
subocrtbing
to the organization and
classification
Of data which the agreement decrees.
45
*'

e

live

»

’

then,

in a world of appearances,

a world in which

reality is not only throttled spatiotemporally
as Kant
assumed but arranged in many ways according
,

to the twistings

and turnings of language.
In the light of the Whorfian
hypothesis,

the Kantian

system can be seen to be amended in such a
way that much of
the previously discussed criticisms of Kant
are rendered
impotent.

If the internal workings of language
contain an

implicit metaphysics by means of which its speakers
posit

a

reality, then it is not surprising that Paton found
question

with Kant's theory of spatial and temporal intuitions.

Paton

felt that neither space by itself nor time by itself is
a

sufficient condition lor all sensual knowledge, that only
their concatenation--space-time--can serve this function.

3uch

a

belief seems to anticipate Whorf's inferred contention

that intuitions of space and time together are derivable from
the metaphysics implicit in language.

Russell, it is recalled, contended that Kant’s system

does not state why the mind orders the manifold of sensation
as it does and not otherwise.

Whorf's hypothesis, however,

readily explains this criticism.

Different languages comprise

different systems of metaphysics.

Western languages, because

of their great similarity,

45

Ibid

"cut up reality" in one particular
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way,

but not the only way.

For example, it is Vhorf's

contention that our long standing
substance-attribute ontology
is a reflection of the
subject-predicate pattern inherent in
the syntax of Indo-European languages.
Our language embodies
a "mechanistic'' 40 metaphysics.

As such:

the mechanistic way of thinking is
perhaps
Pe 0f synt x nat ural to Mr. Everyman's daily
®
:;”®
.
?
S
of the western Indo-European languages,
rigid if ied
Q ?
and
intensified by Aristotle and the latter's
ledieval
medieval
and modern followers. *7
.

.

.

^

fc

,

On the other hand, the Hopi cuts up the
world in a different

way according

,o

^

kind of syntax resembling chemical

combination.

Similarly

,

it is Whorl's belief that objects are
arranged

by us in a Euclidian fashion because Euclidean geometry
is

implicit in Western languages and is, therefore, an integral
part of our cultural Weltanschauung.

Of this, Whorf says

the following:

Just as it is possible to have any number of geometries
other than the Euclidean which give an equally perfect
account of space configurations, so it is possible to
have descriptions of the universe, all equally valid,
that do not contain our familiar contrasts of time and
space.
The relativity viewpoint of modern physics is
one such view, conceived in mathematical terms, and
the Hopi Weltanschauung is another and quite different
one, non-mathematical and 'linguistic.
Thus, the Hopi language and culture conceals a
METAPHYSICS, such as our so-called naive view of space
and time does, or as the relativity theory does; yet

46

Ibid

.

4? Ibid

.

4
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.

,
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,
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it is a different metaphysics
from either.

xt is no wonder, then,

that Euclidian geometry is as
pervasive

ns it is in thought and
perception.

In addition, Whorl "

theory gives all knowledge, sensory
as well as "formal " a
single origin in language. Thus,
our knowledge of space and
time comes from the sane place as
our knowledge of smell and
taste, a la Russell.
In the realm of the understanding,
language can again

be seen as underlying the Kantian
forms, this time the
forms (categories) underlying thought
as such.
We have

followed Kant's search for finding pure
concepts of the
understanding, concepts which act as the rules
and criteria
of all judgement.
Kant believed he found such universal forms
of thought in their entirety as given in
Aristotelian logic,

ihese forms of thought he called categories, by
means of

which objects of experience are related, contrasted,
and, in
general, thought.

However, we have seen that the Kantian

categories are by no means complete, nor have they the

universality which Kant attributes to them.
Vhorf seems generally to agree with Kant’s method.
too,

He,

senses the necessity of finding the set of rules by

which thought proceeds.

However, unlike Kant, ^horf realizes

that there is something more basic than logic, something

which

,

in fact,

presents the logic of thought in entirely

different forms in different cultures.

^ Ibid

.

.

p. 238.

This underlying factor
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Is language.

The overt and covert forces
within language,
the way language fits together,
is the way the speakers
of
that language must fit together
the objects of sensation
so
that these objects may be thought.
He maintains:
actually, thinking is most
mysterious unrl hv
+.u
greatest light upon it that we havens
'thro™
bf the®
study of language.
This study shows that the form of
P
oontroll
by inexorable laws
«?
of pcettorn
pattern of
of°whi^h
which he is unconscious.
These
Unperce ved intricat ® systematizations natters
of his
.
i
n ilanguage
shown
readily enough by a candid
comparison and contrast with other
languages esneoiaiiv
lly
a
8nt

U ^i S

tic famifyf I!s'thi^ng
s:iM,
if"r
1
language in English, in Sanscrit, in
CMniL
ebe *. fa every lan guage is a vast
pattern

^f

system
culturally ordained
the personality not
only communicates, but also analyzes
nature,
neglects types of relationships and phenomena,notices or
channels
hib reasoning, and builds the house of
his consciousness.
ei3t

thff
the forms

fr

in whiGh
°^ hers
andf categories by which
»

ar> e

Thus, the internal workings of language not
only present
a framework in which the manifold or flux of
sensation is

unified and presented as coherent experience, but may
also
be seen as presenting the completed list of categories
which

serve as a set of rules and criteria by which the mind may

relate and compare pre-arranged objects of experience.

The

Kantian thing-in-itself may be viewed as what lies outside the

linguistic framework of sensation and thought.

In this way,

Whorf’s metaphysics is greatly similar to Kant's.

Both agree

that we live in a world of appearances, a world which is pre-

formed by certain structuring agents.

However, Kant believed

that there was but one world of appearances, the universality

50 Ibid

.

.

p.

252.
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of these appearances being
necessitated by the functioning
of the human mind.
For Whorf, however, there
are as many’
different realities as there are
languages; for each language
embodies a cultural metaphysics.
He states:
The real question is: What do
different larrma^Q
W th th © artificially isolated
objects "[of
sensation]T but with the flowing face
of
nature in
1 ,s motion, color, and
changing form, with clouds
beaches and yonder flights of birds?
For, as roes’
our segmentation of the face of nature,
so r 0 fs our
physics of the cosmos. 51
clo

>

Hence, language cuts up nature and
gives form to the unformed

according to its internal workings.

But in what sense can

the ordering nature of language be a
priori in the Kantian

sense of the word?

Whorf seems to indicate that the prior

existence of some language pattern is both
necessary and
sufficient to produce some thought pattern.

In this sense

language is logically prior to thought, although
language
itself is learned through experience.
At this point, it must be stated emphatically
that the

parallelisms

I

have here outlined between the Whorf-Sapir

hypothesis and the F.antian transcendental system are

completely inferred.

As previously mentioned, Whorf never

formally tied his beliefs to Kant's.
that

I

For this reason much

have noted lacks a certain degree of specificity.

As

'horf’s accounts may suffer from too great a generality, so

mine must also.

^ 1 Ibid

.

.

p.

244.
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What

then

are the Principal improvements
of the
Whorf ian hypothesis with respect
to the Kantian system?
Firstly, Whorf recognizes not
only a relativity of
categorical
schemes, but presents the basis
of a more inclusive set of
categories than Kant envisioned.
Secondly, Whorf has accounted
for not only the genesis of the
Kantian categories, but also
has explained the Kantian pure
intuitions of space
'

’

and time

and made them beliefs understandable
in the light of modern
science and mathematics. Thirdly,
Whorf presents empirical
evidence for his beliefs. This evidence,
anthropological
and linguistic in nature, is designed
to show how the workings
of language effect a structuring
of the universe by its

speakers.

As Whorf believes that his thesis is
scientifically

verifiable, we shall shortly embark upon a
more empirical

investigation of his claims.

For the moment, however, it

may be seen that the inferred Whorf ian
reformulation of the

Kantian system stands or falls with Whorf*

s

doctrine of

linguistic relativity, and more definitely, with his doctrine
of linguistic determinism.

However, further specifics must

await a critical evaluation of Whorf*
1,_

s

claims.

The Case for Linguistic Relativity and Determinism

.

We have seen that the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis has many
points in common with the neo-Kantian philosophjr of Ernst

Cassirer and others.

However, Whorf's hypothesis, unlike

similar neo-Kantian doctrines, claims to be amenable to
empirical investigation

.

In fact, Whorf believes he has

5

70

provided such evidence from the
fields of linguistics and
anthropology to buttress his
contentions. 2 To render
explicit the senses in which
language presents the Kantian
categories and intuitions of sensation,
it behooves
us to

examine this evidence.
The evidence Whorf presents for
his doctrines of linguistic
relativity and determinism comes
largely from anthropological
linguistics
owever, evaluation of this sort of
evidence is
the task of the linguist.
What I shall here be concerned
with is the philosophical import
of Whorf’ s procedure.
T -T

.

Io sup ort his beliefs, Whorf
claims to have discovered

a way ox

breaking down language into .subsys terns
composed of
patterns.
Patterns are formed of words that exhibit a
mutual "rapport, “ enabling them to "work together
'

to any

semantic result.

As such:

ls t\ls raPPort
H
thought insofar as

that constitutes the real essence of

it is linguistic . 55

Words are held in rapport by the workings of invisible
"linkage
bonds."

The centering of words around these linkage bonds

become recognisable as what Whorf calls a "covert class.”

52

An excellent discussion of Whorf’ s linguistic analysis
of American Indian languages and how they support his contentions is presented by Roger Brora, Words and Things (Glencoe,
I1L: The Free Press, 1959), p. 229f .
and Paul Henle. Langcuaee.
i hough t.
and Culture (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1958)
p. If.
,

,
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Covert classes differ from
commop overt classes In
that the
former are readily seen as
part of the grammar of the
language
in question, the latter
being more difficult to observe.

Whorf gives the following example
which may clarify the
differences between covert and overt
classes:

^

5
lstic clas sification
like English render
8 ”°
ert
actualized
°y
along Slth the
?? t e
as
but which operates through an
?
°l
invi'qihin
Slble « central
exchange" of linkage bonds in
way as t0 determine certain other
words which
,
?u
1 C
C0VERT
in contrast to
an'ov^l
an
? as gender
OVJli class, such
in Latin. 56

A

J

i

U

It is Whorf's contention that
the aforementioned

patterns—

discoverable by investigating the covert
categories or forms
of language— have "meaning," giving
vent to a particular
conceptual scheme.
Hiorf calls

These "meaningful" grammatical arrangements

"cryptotypes

."

^

To use his example, Whorf

observes three classes of Hopi verbs. 58

Upon further analysis,

he isolates a set of covert categories or
cryptotypes which

may be seen to underlie their use.

He states:

Prom phenomena of this sort, which are not confined
to the inceptive problem but pervade all Hopi
grammar
I conclude that there must be to
the Hopi speaker a
dimly felt relation of similarity between the verb
usages in eacn group having to do with some inobvious
facet of their meaning, and therefore itself a meaning, but one so nearly at or below the threshold of
conscious thinking, that it cannot be put into words
by the user and eludes translation.
To isolate,
characterize and understand the operation of these
dimly felt, barely conscious (or even unconscious)
meanings is the object of ny further analysis. Such
an illusive, hidden, but functionally important
5^
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meaning

I

call a "CBYPTOTYPE.

"-59

These crypto types, then, convey
a hidden meaning displaying
part of the overall pattern of
the Hopi picture of the
universe.
However, there ere many who
disagree
with Whorf'

imputation of meaning to these covert
linguistic categories.
Black, for example, maintains:
di
iculty lies in the claim that the
i
{£
ryptotypes
have meaning for the unsophisticated
v
speaker,
••••horf speaks of "a sort of
habitual
J
f
consciousness";
of "a submerged, subtle, and elusive
meaning,
of a ’formless idea," a "rising toward
ful.er consciousness ... of linkage bonds,"
and so
on.
nit it Is hard to believe that the
ordinary
speaker is aware of a grammatical classification
takes all the virtuosity of a Whorf to discover. that
I
doubt ,hat the average English speaker realizes
that
the particle "un-" can be prefixed only to
transitive
verbs of a "covering, enclosing, and surface
attaching
meaning that constitutes a prototype. Whorf himself
must have the concept since he succeeds in
expressing
it, but the man in the English street simply
uses
UT1 **„ in ha PP
Here I think Whorf commits
y ignorance.
>d)e
linguist s fallacy’ of imputing his own sophisticated attitudes to the speakers he is studying. The
heuristic value of the notion of a crypto type is
manifested in its capacity to induce verifiable predictions; the rest is mythical psychology.6o
'

5

1

There is, this investigator believes, a great deal in what

Black has to say.

Whorf needs to show further proof for the

contention that these cryptotypes have meaning.

Even if

linguists universally agreed on the imputation of meaning to
a cryptotype,

Whorf'

s

claim that such

a

meaning is part and

parcel of an implicit metaphysics would remain unsubstantiated.

59
6o

Ibid

Black, op. cit .. p. 2^7.
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Let us examine more closely
Whorf

»s

belief that we "cut

up nature, organize it into
concepts" 61 by way of language.

He supplies us with two kinds
of proof for this contention.
First, we are presented with data
concerning the Nootka
language of a certain Vancouver Island
Indian culture. Whorf
points out the fact that in this language
a single word will
often express what in English will require
a complete

sentence to be intelligible.
sentence,

For example, the English

"He invites people to a feast.",

be the single word,

in Nootka, would

"tl irashya isita »itlma, 62 literally
'

'

translated as "Boiled eaters go for he does."

exanole is taken from the Apache language.
the English sentence,

Another

It is seen that

"It is dripping spring,

0

when literally

translated from an equivalent Apache expression, becomes
hit en ess moves downward.

Fhorf draws the conclusion:

thinking.

0

From these and other examples,
"How utterly unlike our way of

According to Whorf:

These examples show that some languages have means
of expression chemical combination, 'as I called
it
in which the separate terms are not so separate
as in English but flow together into plastic
synthetic creations. Hence, such languages, which
do not paint the separate-object picture of the
universe to the same degree as English and its
sister tongues, point toward new types of logic and

—

—

6l Whorf, op. cit
.. p. 213.
62

u3

Xbid

.

.

p.

Ibld

.

.

p. 241.

64 Ibid.

243.

.

74

possible new oosmical pictures. 6 ^
ThUS

llter ’ 1 translat i°u is supposed
to indicate how diverse
languages "out up" or "segment"
the universe in different
fashions.
In this way language embodies
a metaphysics
partially explicable by such
translations.
’

second class of proof concerns
the referent categories
and names a particular language
may apply to phenomena.
Vhorf seems most interested in cases
in which one language
has a single category or name for
something while another
language has more than one (i.e., different)
categories for

referring to the same thing.

For example, Vhorf shows that

in Hopi there is a single word for
all

birds
fly,

flying things except

Vhere speakers of English say "aviator,"
"butter-

.

and

"airplane,

1

the Hopi can use only a single word.

Another example of this is noted by Brown. 67

In this case it

is found that the Eskimo lexicon contains
three words to

denote different kinds of snow for which English does
not
;

/e

their single-word equivalents.

for all three.

It seems we use "snow"

From these and other examples of names and

lack of names, categories rich in distinctions and poor in

distinctions all differing from what is found

in English,

Vhorf would have us believe that speakers of diverse languages
see and understand entirely different relationships among

65
66

67

Ibid
Ibid

.

.

p.

209.

Brown, op. cit

..

p.

231*.

.
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phenomena than we do.

Such differences, he maintains,
again
show how language contains hidden
metaphysical schemes.
Let us now examine the grounds
upon which Whorf's
"proofs" may be seen to support his
thesis; that language
"cuts up" and "segments" reality and
imputes a "metaphysics"
to its speakers.
Assessing Whorf's use of literal trapsla t ion, Brown says the following:

Perhaps horf's Indian premises ought to
be applied
to trench
German or Latin, and we should all speak
of psychological differences between
peoples who
ad
ctives before nouns and those‘ who put them
^H
after. 00
r

,

As any literal translation of German will show, ^9
the

structural variance between literally translated German and

English is practically as great as between Hopi and English.
Are we to assume, on the basis of differently structured
grammar, that the German people have a distinctly different
world

viei\T

than we do?

By Whorf's own admission, however,

we all share a common Western Weltanschauung.

Thus,

it seems

that V/horf allows the products of sympathetic translation to
be admissible as evidence for his contention is some cases,
but not in others.

W© must agree with Brown that:

We do not have the basic knowledge in psychology and
language that would enable us to decide intelligently
on the premises that ought to underlie translation.
The evidence of the literal translation does not
establish linguistic relativity.
The relativity is
assumed in the premises underlying Whorf's "unsympathetic" translations. 70

5

'

:

'

'Ibid.,

:°

70

p.

233

.

Ibid

.

.

p.

233.

Ibid

.

,

p.

232
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As such,

Whorf

raay

be once again guilty of what
Black terras

the "linguist's fallacy," that
is, reading attitudes
into
the speakers of the languages
under study.
what are we to make of the cases
Whorf cites where certain
languages contain particular names and
referent categories
for phenomena that other languages
do not classify or name in
the same way? Does Whorf believe that
the Hopi, whose

language contains no distinguishing names or
categories for
the English "butterfly," "aviator," or
"airplane," does not
cognitively distinguish between these three phenomena?
It

may be seen, to use another example, that although
English

presents no formal words to distinguish between types
of snow
as do Eskimo languages, we have no difficulty recognizing
and

conceptualizing different types of snow.
points out,

In fact, Brown

children readily identify many varieties of

snow; i.e., hard -packing, soft-packing, sleigh-riding, etc.

Moreover, skiers identify granular, powder, "sugar," and

"good-tracking" snow.

Aside from the obvious perceptual

distinctions between butterflies, airplanes, and the like,
there seems to be no reason to assume that the Hopi is unable
to distinguish perceptually or conceptually between these

"flying things" in spite of the fact that his language makes
no provisions for such distinctions.

In fact,

there seems to

be universal agreement among linguists that equivalent

phenomena can be recognized by speakers of any language. 72

71
72

Ibid

.

Ibid
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p. 236.
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Vhorf's error may again be the
"linguist's fallacy."
Another pertinent criticism of the
Whorfian hypothesis
in either form of presentation
concerns
the idea of

Weltanschauung.

According to Vhorf, a particular
language
embodies an implicit metaphysics which,
in turn, gives vent
to or determines the world view or
Weltanschauung
of its

speakers.

However,

it seems quite peculiar that within
the

course of history, the speakers of SAE ? 3 (standard
Average
European the similarity of Western- languages
allows them to
be lumped into one group) have never universally
agreed on

any philosophy nor subscribed to any one world view.
then, is the metaphysics inherent in SAE?

Weltanschauung?

What,

What is the Western

The philosophy that Vhorf professes to

discern in SAE is not the unformulated world view of the layman or the man in the street, but is a tintype of Newtonian

scientific theory.
Weltanschauung.

This,

horf believes, is our particular

It is here that Max Black introduces a

salient criticism:
To the contention that this is the metaphysics
embodied in the western languages (only awaiting
formulation by the analyst) the sufficient answer
is that Descartes
another "standard average
European "--was led to a metaphysical system radically
different.
Languages that botu Hume and Hegel could
use with equal fluency can hardly embody a unique
philosophy. 74

—

In what sense,

73

then,

can we be said to have one world view?

A horf,

op. cit

..

p.

138.

^Black,

op. cit

..

p.

254.

r
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In addition,

if the doctrine of
linguistic determinism is
accepted, one would be hard
put to account for the
presence
of such intellectual giants
as Einstein, Whitehead,
and
Bergson; for they were able
to compose philosophical
systems

clearly antagonistic to Whorf's
-Newtonian Western Weltanschauung.” Moreover, it is
indeed a wonder how Whorf
himself
was able to escape the linguistic
"thought-chains" of his
native English and understand the
linguistic and thought

processes of the Hopi Indians, the
culture from which most
of his inferences are drawn.
It is, of course, an obvious
fact that a particular

language and vocabulary is imposed upon
the minds of children
by parents of a particular culture.
In this
sense a kind of

determinism exists; for the linguistic behavior
of the parent
exists before that of the child. However,
Brown points out:

called "cats*' and dogs "dogs," but, in
the former are fed milk while the latter
bones
referent categories revealed by
the child in his naming behavior could have been
learned from the non-linguistic discriminating
behavior of his parents. 75

addition

,

«

Thus,

it is safe to say that a child inherits a language

(vocabulary and grammar) from his parents, but this is

a far

cry from the contention that categories of thought are

inherited in the same way.
This brings us to perhaps the most cogent criticism that
can be levelled against the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis as it stands.

75'Brown, op. cit

..

p.

260.
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Whorf does not distinguish
operationally between the thought
and language in question.
Until this is done it is
impossible
to fit any kind of empirical
evidence
to his hypothesis.

If

thought is defined in terms of
language, which it seems to
be
for Whorf then the connection
between the two is one of
logical necessity.
It is therefore not surprising
that Whorf
found his convictions so convincing.
,

To render Whorf* s hypothesis
amenable to empirical

testing it is necessary to operationally
define both thought
and language and measure their relationship.
There is a

certain sense of the relativity thesis that
is established
on this basis.

If "language" is defined as a formal
system

(phonology, morphology, and grammar), and "thought"
as a set
of categories serving as rules for naming, the
thesis that

language and thought covary is established if it is shown
that

formally distinct languages are also semantically distinct.
•3rown

believes that there is ample evidence that this is true

on the level of the lexicon and of certain grammatical
ns

categories.

The evidence Brora presents for his belief

leans heavily upon a study made by Zipf in 1935- 77

Compiling

lists of writings in Chinese, Latin, British and American

English, Zipf showed that there exists a statistical tendency
in language for the length of a word to negatively correlate

with its frequency of usage.

76

77

Ibid

.
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Examples of this phenomenon are

:

80

very common.

For instance, common names
are shortened to

nickname©.

television" has been shortened
to "video" and
finally to T
In general, then, as a word
becomes more
commonly used, it tends to become
shortened. What is here
important to note is that Zipf's
correlation greatly bears
upon Vhorf's contention.
Of this Brown states:

ouppose we generalize the finding beyond
formulation and propose that the length ofZipf's
expression (codability) provides an index a verbal
of its
frequency in speech, and that this, in
turn, is an
index ol the frequency with which the
relevant
judgements of difference and equivalence
are made.
18
£ true
it would follow that the Eskimo
A
J*?
f
distinguishes
his throe kinds of snow more often
than Americans do. 78
»

,

Ihus, Zipf'g correlation gives substance
to a certain sense

of linguistic relativity.

According to this view, a given

language does not determine its speakers to think or
perceive

according to certain patterns, but favors or encourages
the
discrimination of certain patterns over others.

An Italian,

for example, whose language makes no provision for the

recognition of many types of snow, can discriminate among as

many varieties of snow as can the Eskimo, whose language
contains such provisions.

The,

to make such discriminations.

Italian, however, is not prone

Swanson sums up this view as

f ollows

For although in Italian or English we could by means
of circumlocution, Identify the different kinds of
snow, the absence of a short and readily available
term for these categories [consistent with Zipf's law]
.

78

Ibid

.

.

p.

238.
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.

31

discourages us, as it were, from
doing so. 7 ?
Furthermore, Henle states:
q Sti0?1 t en becomes one of whether
knowing an
i?
i'?L o?
f
”*" at least
0Ca K Ulary
on
e Which has
«nn?^ +-T
^
tc serlse experience—
constitutes a set
\
directed toward
perceiving in terms of this word
Ihe existence of such a set would
mean noticing
those aspects of the environment
to the application
of the term and tending to neglect
others.BO
ihis sense of linguistic relativity
seems quite reasonable.

However, it is a far cry from what Whorf
has claimed.

Brown has devised a method for testing a
more exciting
form of the relativity thesis.

He would proceed by

defining "language” so as to include semantics
and
defining thought' in terms of some nonlinguistic
behavior.
In general the thesis here would be
some nonlinguistic evidence of thought covaries that
with
some linguistic evidence.
For example, it might be
maintained that making statues of justice goes with
the membership of the word with this concept
in a
form class that has generally the "object or
"thing"
semantic.
The relativity thesis could then be
checked by looking at the statues and form classes of
social groups and of individuals 81
.

As regards determinism:
If an attempt is made to go beyond relativity to
determinism we see at once that there are two possible
kinds of chronological priority the linguistic’ form
might have either historical or biographical. One
could see whether the linguistic practice preceded the
making of statues in the history of a group and one
could see whether knowledge of the linguistic practice
came before the inclination to make a statue in the
life of the individual. 32

—

7 ?J

V. Swanson, "Linguistic Relativity and Translation,"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. XXII, No. 2,
( December
1961), 185-192.
.

.

,

^Henle, op.
'^Brown,
82 Ibid.

op.

ci

.

ci

.

.

p.

6.

p.

262

.

.

,

82

However

it is significant
that Brown states:

though?: wh
° f rel t

?KrSf

d

?S^“i?*

8

of

.^We

sH^ ^ ?
f-

X aon't
that "an ?SepaS«tlJ

ses-s s
b

It

is

le

^ irst

seen,

and

t0 sh

t

step toward demonstrating
it. §3

™

rSt

M

J

^

then,

that only after many studies
of the type
Brown proposes, will it be
possible to suggest which
features
of grammar might in general
be expected to correlate
with
language.
In so doing, the philosophical
maxim "correlation
does not imply causality" must be
taken heed of.
How, then,

determinism?

stands the case for linguistic
relativity and
Not too good— in its Whorfian form.
The

generality of Whorf's hypothesis, coupled
with the unprovable
form in which it is presented, prevents
empirical testing.
Moreover, the failure of Whorf's doctrines
to stand up to

philosophical examination casts grave doubts
upon its validity.
However, a mild form of the relativity thesis,
which carefully

discriminates between the language and thought in
question,
seems to be acceptable to many linguists and
philosophers.
It is important to note that this sense of
the relativity

thesis is believed secure enough to overthrow the traditional

copy

theory of language.

However, it is generally agreed

that more data is needed in order to make any stronger

assertions in favor of '/horf’s contentions.

S3

Ibid

Future studies

.

83

might reveal such meaningful
relationships between language
and thought, but it is safe to
say
that they will not

maintain the more extreme kind of
relationships that Whorf
envisioned

vv
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A.

LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY

Introduction

We have seen that the Whorf-Sapir
hypothesis seems to
bolster the Kantian system and
account for many of its

inconsistencies.

However, it seems that the form in
which

it is presented and,

indeed, much of the matter of its

beliefs, prevent it from having much
objective merit as a
scientific hypothesis or as a philosophical
system.
Nevertheless, Whorf's writings are not of
little value. We have
seen that their reformulation by Brown and
others have raised
a moderate form of the Whorfian claim
to the status of a

tenable scientific hypothesis.

In addition,

Whorf’s writings

have motivated linguists, anthropologists, and
psychologists
toward research in the field of psycho-linguistics—
that

hybrid discipline which investigates psychologically the

connection between language and thought.

As regards philosophy,

however, there is yet another approach to the problem of the

relation of language to thought which remains to be investigated

— viz.

linguistic philosophy.

To this we will now proceed.

At the turn of the century many philosophical disciplines

broke away from the main subject area of philosophy and became

self-sufficient, empirical, scientific domains.

These

sciences, as well as the many others already in existence,

85

boasted a distinct subject matter
within relatively well
defined limits.
The newly formed science of
psychology,
adopting the scientific method of inquiry,
invaded the very
strongholds of traditional philosophical subject
matter.
Furthermore, progress in these fields showed
that philosophy
could not hope to compete with the methods
of empirical
science.

What, then, was left for philosophy?

What was to

be philosophy's subject matter and its limits
in the light of

these new and well defined sciences?
At this time a new sphere of philosophical study
emerged.
It came as almost a revelation to philosophers
searching for

the proper area in which to direct their activities.

This

new philosophical interest centered around the idea of
"meaning" 1

— that

sense of meaning embodied by language in its

capacity to permit communication.

As such, language presents

the basic building blocks of meaning which,

in its use, can

be studied in its most highly developed form.

In this regard,

philosophers carefully distinguished between an objectlanguage and a meta-language.

An object-language is the common

language of a particular discipline.

A meta-language is a

language developed for the purpose of analysing the meanings
and uses of words expressed by the object-language.

As such,

philosophy witnessed a shift of emphasis from the strict
study of ethics, theology, etc., to the study of meta-ethics,

^Cf. Erik Stenius, Wittgenstein's "Tractatus
Cornell University Press, i960), p. If.

"

(Ithaca:
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meta-theology, etc.

Thus, philosophers proceeded
to logically

clarify and Illuminate the ends
of language and the ways
which language is able to achieve
these ends. The linguistic
philosopher, then, scrutinizes all
statements— those

m

made by
theologians, mathematicians, scientists,
philosophers, etc.,
past and present— bringing his
new techniques to bear

on them

as well.

In time,

linguistic significance became the
primary
subject matter of contemporary philosophy.
Once stated, it soon became apparent
to many philosophers
that this new understanding of the
proper subject matter of
philosophy was "new" in its explicitness
only.
The history
of philosophy since the time of Socrates,
whose passionate

interest was in the meaning of "Justice,” "Knowledge,"
and
"Good," could also be interpreted as a quest for
meaning.

Thus,

the methods and subject matter of traditional
philosophy

was not entirely alien to the new formulation of
philosophy's

sphere of interest.
As more and nore philosophers joined the bandwagon of

linguistic philosophy, the method and goals of their pursuit
solidified.

Instead of attempts at synthesis typical of the

philosophy of the past, linguistic philosophy unfurled the
banner of analysis.

The function of philosophy under the new

auspices, then, was to engage in the analysis of the meaning
and structure of language.

As such, the relation of thought

to language is much akin to this pursuit.

Neo-Kantians

contended that Kant's thesis is greatly supported if language
is seen to present the perceptual patterns of experience and

87

the categories of thought.

Whorf and Saplr maintained
a

doctrine of the relation of language
to thought that infers
a similar assertion from data
in anthropology and
linguistics,
however linguistio philosophers,
in their study of meaning
and language, present other
approaches to the neo-Kantlan
contention of the connection between
language
,

and the

rhilosophy of Kant.
In this paper,

of P.

Strawson.

I

will consider one such approach, that

Strawson's philosophy, although

structurally similar in principle to that of Kant
and his
followers differs mainly as to the methods employed
,

in

analysis and the evidence Strawson submits for his
beliefs.
In this sense Strawson's philosophy offers a
different

approach to the problem at hand.

Let us proceed to investigate

Strawson's contention with an eye toward its relevance to
Kant's hypothesis.

88
B.

Location of Particulars

Before exploring that part of
Strawson’s philosophical
endeavor pertinent to the matter
at hand, it may be well
to
outline first some epistemological
considerations important
as background to the proper
understanding

of his philosophy.

The common man has long believed
that everyday things,
ordinary sorts of physical objects
that are freely recognized
and commonly talked of in his social
milieu, are indeed the
most real things imaginable. The eminent
Dr. Johnson expressed
this belief succinctly by kicking a now
famous stone to show
its reality.
We must agree that it is difficult to
doubt
the full existence of something publicly
observed, felt, and

discoursed about.

Now we must ask, do we know these ordinary,

public objects only as subjective sense data,
or do we know
and understand subjective sense data by means
of objective

public objects?
former thesis.

Unlike Dr. Johnson, Berkeley maintained the
Impressed with the fact that we know external

objects only mediately through the senses, Berkeley embarked
upon a philosophical venture that would deny their existence.

Uowever

,

in his

quest to prune bare sense data from external

objects, Berkeley had continually to refer to public objects
to locate these sense data.

In describing a private sense

datum, one must resort to describing what is publicly understood as a color, sound, smell, etc., if one is to communicate.

When one tries to describe a particular private sensation, one
finds that reference to a particular public thing
object, etc.

— best

identifies this sense datum.

—a

color,

It seems,

39

then,

that private sense data are
identified and rendered

communicable (objective) by reflecting
them in public objects.
As Berkeley succeeded in communicating
his
impressions, it is

assumed that he as well must have relied
upon public external
objects as the locus of objective (communicative)
reference
to private sensations.
How, then, is it possible
to

explicitly doubt the existence of external objects
if one is
logically dependent upon them for communication?
Thus,

it

seems that Berkeley's quest is doomed to failure;
for we must
assume the latter hypothesis— that private sense
data are

understood (rendered intelligible) only in
objects

— in

terras of

public

order to prove the former.

nevertheless, there have been philosophers of this

century who have tried to isolate private sense data from
public objects and to understand science as that pursuit
which merely classifies and systematizes regularities in this

bare stream of raw experience.

This doctrine may be called

positivism, or radical empiricism.

However, sense data seem

inseparable from the objects by way of which sensations are
presented.

We cannot feel unless there is an object blocking

the path of our hand.

Similarly, there must be something

present to absorb or reflect light for us to see.
then,

It seems,

that the only way to make sense out of the statement

"raw experience exhibits regularities," is to understand
"raw experience" as ordinary experience; our everyday

experience which indeed exhibits regularities.
is not the sense that was intended.

As defined,

However, this
raw

90

experience must be unstructured
to note,

in the words of Quine,

Accordingly, it is important
that

u

vaw

experience simply will not of n-q P
an autonomous domain!
References to
r
is largely what holds it
together. 2

„

,

SpiiiKbiSf
objects

Thus, objects are inseparable
from experience.

In addition,

external objects, or rather reference
to external objectssinoe in memory they are no longer
present as objects-gives
us continuing access to the realm
of past impressions.
In
fact, it is believed that external
objects and reference to

external objects is what gives continuity
to experience past,
present, and future.
Let us now investigate what it means
to refer to external
objects.
It is significant that Chisholm 3
has found that

memories are traces not of past sensations but
of past

conceptualization and verbalization.
fairly plausible hypothesis.
weather,

I

In

This seems to be

a

reflecting upon yesterday's

recall the fact that it was "raining."

that the sky was "grey" and the rain felt "wet."

I

remember

However,

I

have not here recaptured the feeling^ (sensations) of the

day's greyness or wetness.

I

may try to imagine being "wet"

or seeing "grey," but such an attempt can only begin to

approach the vivacity of the original.
blue sky further mock this endeavor.
I

Today's hot sun and
In remembering,

then,

have substituted the linguistic entities "wet" and "grey"

^Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object (Boston: The
Technology Press and New York: John Wiley and Sons, i960), p.

2

3ft. M. Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca
Cornell University Press, 1957), P« 108.

.

—

.
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for yesterday's particular bundle of
sense data.

We may now

see that much of present experience,
past experience, and
much that is anticipated as future
experience, is bound up
with verbalization and conceptualization.
Reference to

external objects

— hereafter

called particulars

— is

thus

intimately related to the medium in which such
reference
takes place,

i.e.,

language.

One of the functions of

language, then, is to refer to particulars.

General reference

and identifying reference to particulars are made through
its

office.

Such reference to particulars, it is believed,

allows for the continuity of our experiences.
'•hat

may be inferred from the previous statements?

If

the continuity of our experience is based upon reference to

particulars and if, in conception, language presents the
verbal patterns in which such identifying reference takes
place, it seems that

.we

may rightly infer that an

investigation of language--the conceptual use of language
might reveal a conceptual scheme which would explain how our

reference to particulars, and, therefore, our coherency of
experience, proceeds.

This is what P. F. Strawson has

attempted in his book Individuals '?
Strawson

terras

his endeavor "descriptive metaphysics"-^

and claims that it is in the Kantian tradition of

^P. F. Strawson, Individuals: An assay in Descriptive
Metaphysics (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd ., 1959)
3

Ibld
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transcendental philosophy.

As such, his ala Is to
describe

the actual structure of our
thoughts about the world. He
is
concerned with isolating and exhibiting
certain entities that
must be recognized as playing a
fundamental role in all our
thought about things and events. It
is not surprising
that

these basic entities are found to be
particulars. To clarify
and understand the role played by
particulars, Strawson
begins his treatment of the subject with
an investigation of
what it means to identify.
It is first noticed that there is
a speaker's and a

hearer's sense of the term "identify." 6
an identifying reference to a particular.

A speaker may make

If the hearer

knows which particular is being referred to, he
is able to
identify" that particular.

'-r

ith this sense of "identity"

rendered explicit, Strawson proceeds to explore the anatomy
of identification of particulars with an eye toward
locating
the class or classes of particulars that are most basic in

thought
It must be immediately recognized, Strawson argues,

that

there is a sense of identification which must be eliminated
as a non-important and trivial case.

relative identification."

This is called "story

It occurs when a particular is

identified in an immediate speaker-given context.

It is

trivial because the particular is identified in that context

^

Ibid

.

^ Ibid

.

.

p.

16.

.

p.

13.
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and thnt context °"ly. ana is
unrelated to the history and
experience of the hearer.
For example, if a speaker
were to
relate the story of "the three bears”
to the hearer,

identification of "Goldilocks" would
proceed from the story
itself, irrespective of the hearer's
history or
background.

criterion must be invoked to render
this sense of
identification inappropriate to identification

ft

in general.

The forthcoming criterion states that
the particular must be
able to be placed in the hearer's own
picture of the world
8
directly,
independent of the speaker.

These considerations lead Strawson to a
discussion of
demonstrative and non-demonstrative identification
of

particulars.

Demonstrative identification denotes objects

directly given to us, comprising what Wittgenstein termed
"ostensive definition."^

Children learn their first words by

way of ostensive definition.

This process proceeds when a

parent points to a door, says "door," and asks the child to
do the same.

In this way a child learns the names of things.

As such, demonstrative identification poses no real problems
to the identification of particulars in general.

It fits

well within the bounds of the formerly stated criterion.

However, demonstrative identification accounts for a small

number of cases of what is understood by identification.

We

may have only so many particulars directly confronting us at
8

Ibid

.

.

p.

19.

^Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations trans
lated by G. E. M. Anscombe fNew York: The Macmillan Co., 1961)
,

p.

7.

t
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a specific time.

Accordingly, unless there are
cases of
non -demonstrative identification
of particulars,

there would

be

\

ery little that could be truly
communicated.

In most
communication, then, identification of
particulars proceeds
by way of non-demonstrative
identification. This

occurs when

demonstrative identification is impossible
because the
particular to be identified is not sensibly
present.

It has been argued that we can
never be sure that a non-

demonstrative identification succeeds in
individuating a
specific particular, for there is always the

chance of finding

duplication in the universe.

As non-demonstrative

identification can proceed only with the backing of
general

descriptions of the particular in question, there is some
question whether any number of descriptions can succeed in

individuating

a

specific particular.

For example, there might

be another particular answering the same descriptions as the

particular the speaker has in mind existing in another part
of the universe.

Strawson counters this argument with the

suggestion that non-demonstrative identification may rest on
a basic demonstrative element. ^

He finds it necessary to

admit that we are each in possession of a unified system of
spatial and temporal relations in which every particular is

uniquely related to every other.

By demonstrative identifi-

cation we can determine a common point of spatial and temporal

10 „

otrawson, op. ci

n ibid.

,

p.

25

.

.
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22.
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reference

and from this it is possible
to deduce the location

,

of other particulars in space
and time relative to our
reference point. Thus, Strawson,
as well as Kant, found a

peculiar comprehensiveness and
pervasiveness associated with
spatiotemporal relations. Accordingly,
he states
that space

and time serve as the framework
in which we may organize

individuating thought about particulars.

Thus, the system

described is a transcendental system in
sense of describing
our one of many possible schemes of
understanding the world.
as with Kant,

according

the knower shapes and forms the objective
world

go his

ways of knowing.

Strawson's endeavor is

concerned with exhibiting our peculiar scheme of
understanding
the world

"out there."

According to Strawson, our

identification of particulars, of particular things and
events
in a spatiotemporal framework, allows for our
single, unified

picture of the world.
If it is conceded that we possess such a system, a

conceptual scheme of spatiotemporal relations, it is necessary
that reidentif ics tion of particulars or acknowledgement of

sameness of particulars, is accounted for.

This is achieved

with due regard to the skeptic by recognizing the following
facts:

12

our observation is limited so that the entire spatio-

temporal framework is not presented to us at any one instant;
there is no part of it that we can continuously observe; and
we do not occupy a fixed position in it.

12

Ibid

.

.

p.

31.
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must lean heavily on what Strawson
terms "qualitative
recurrences
These are separate observations

of the same

patterns and arrangements of objects.
also be shown that the reidentif

In addition,

it can

lcation of places is not

different from the reidentif lcation
of things.
iriCL,

There is, in

an interplay of the two.

Having described a transcendental,
unified, spatiotenporal
system as conditioning our thoughts
of identification
of

particulars, Strawson endeavors to
investigate the possibility
of finding that class or those
classes of particulars upon
which this system of particulars is
based.

It is found that

certain particulars exhibit identif
lability-dependence to
other particulars. As an example, the case
of "private

particulars" is examined. 1 ^

Private particulars are particulars

of mental events and private sense data.

For example, a

buzzing sound may exhibit identif lability-dependence
to the
source of buzzing; a bee, perhaps. More basically,

such sense

data may be traceable to the self-consciousness of the
hearer,
the identif lability-dependence of the buzz to the agent
hearing
the buzz,

the sensing person.

Thus,

these types or categories

of particulars are mainly dependent upon other particulars,

namely persons who have such "feelings

11

,

and therefore display

identifiability-dependence to a set of particulars called
persons.

13

14

Perhaps this is what Kant had in mind in his belief

Ibid

.

IbicI

.

.
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.
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that "I think" must accompany all
representations. One group
of classes displaying identif
iability-dependence are the
classes of theoretical constructs and
unobservables in

general.

These are the postulated entities of
Physics,

Political Science, etc.

Their identification rests upon the

identification of grosser, observable bodies.
ihere are, however, many other classes of
particulars

that may display identif iability-dependence.
time,

At the same

it becomes evident that any particulars
that can be

directly located without the aid of or reference to
any other

particular are the basic particulars that we are searching
for.
To expedite this search, Strawson recognizes two
types or

categories of publicly observable particulars

These are

events and processes (states and conditions) and material
bodies.

results.

This somewhat Whiteheadian*^ division bears fruitful
It is observed that the first category of particulars,

events and processes, suffers from a lack of framework

building adequacy.

They seem to show a dependence upon more

enduring entities, namely the material objects characterizing
the particular events and processes.

They are the White-

headian eternal objects in the guise of material objects.
Thus, material bodies appear to be the basic particulars

for which we are searching.

^ ibia

.

.

They are observable, diverse,

p. ^5.

•^Whitehead recognized two "realms" of actuality. These
were eternal objects (forms) and actual entities (process).
Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, "Process and Reality," Alfred North
Whitehead: An Anthology ed. by P. S. C. Northrop and Mason
Gross (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961)
,

,
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stable,

ar.8

enduring

They are basic constituents
which

secure for us one common and
continuously extendable framework
Terence the framework of spatial location.

—

?rora

our Previous discussion it can be
seen that

Strawson's conclusions are not at all
surprising. What Is of
great Importance to our study is the
fact that Strawson was
led to recognize the existence of
a conceptual
scheme, a

spatloteraporal framework which we all must
possess as a

condition of particular identification and thus
a condition
of our experience being coherent.
However, let us now probe deeper into Strawson's

conceptual scheme to ascertain the exact nature of
this
concept.

He maintains:

... It cannot be denied that each of us, at any
moment, in possession of such a framework a unified
framework of knowledge of particulars, in which we
ourselves, and, usually, our immediate surroundings
have their place, and of which each element is
uniquely related to every other and hence to ourselves
and our surroundings.
This framework we use for this
purpose: not just occasionally and adventitiously
but always and essentially.
.
when we become
sophisticated, we systematize the framework with
calendars, maps, co-ordiante jgystems; but the U 3 e of
such systems turns, fundamentally, on our knowing our
own place in them; though a. man may lose his place
and have to be told it. . .
the system of spatiotemporal relations has a peculiar comprehensiveness
and pervasiveness, which qualify it uniquely to serve
as the framework within which we may organize our
individuating thought ©bout particulars. Every
particular either has its place in this system, i 3 of
a kind the members of which cannot in general be
identified except by reference to particulars of other
kinds which have their place in it; and every
particular which has its place in the system has a
unique place there. 1?
.

.

17

Strawson, op, clt .. p. 24.
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He further states:

MM
a £ r ?®»

then,

that we build up our single
oicturp

*
sometimes,

with the roughest locations of
the
situations and objects we speak of,
allowing agreed
proper names to bear, without further
immense individuating load. This we doexplanation an
quite rationallv
^
confident of a certain community of
experience and
sources of instruction. Yet it Is a
single picture
bU ld
unified structure, in which we our?
qp?lr>,
1V
aVC
pxac
ln which every element is thought
nc
o dl
a^ ectl
\? Y or f»
indirectly related to every other*'
and the ^framework of the structure, the
common, unifying
*
°
system of relations is spatiotemporal
By means of
identifying references, we fit other people’s
reports
and stories, along with our own, into the
single storv
about empirical reality; and this fitting
together, this
nests ultimately upon relating the particulars
which figure in the stories in the single
spatiotemporal
system which we ourselves occupy. 18
*

*

*

.

//hat

Strawson has found is a necessary spatiotemporal

framework which we all must possess.

This "conceptual scheme"

is reminiscent of the priority of space and time in
the

Kantian system.

If you recall, Kant maintained that space

and time are pure forms of intuition— subjective mental forms-

which must be presupposed for a thing to be known objectively
to the inquiring mind.

to this belief.

Strawson’s formulation gives substance

Let us further investigate this notion.

Kant was troubled with the problem of explaining how

subjective sense data can become objectified.

If we merely

received impressions or experienced modifications of

consciousness, we would be shut up in our own subjectivity,
each with his own uncommuni cable solipsistic world.

Our

sensations, Kant believed, must be objectified, must be rendered

18

Ibid

.

p.24.

.
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communicable

anfl

intelligible for knowledge.

Kant's solution
to the problem of how such
objectification occurs in

sensibility is presented in the
Transcendental Aesthetic,
briefly, Kant believes that the
mind contributes

form to the

matter of sensation.
space and time.

These forms are pure intuitions
of

As such, sensations are objectified
by the

mind's spatiotemporalizlng these "raw
feels."

The mind, then

superimposes the forms of space and time
upon the manifold of
sensation allowing for our objective knowledge
of particulars
in space and time.
In this connection, Strawson asks:

"What are the general

conditions of identification of particulars?"^

This

question may be construed as a typically Kantian
question;
for, like Strawson, Kant was concerned with the
conditions

that must be presupposed for objective knowledge.

As such,

Strawson's philosophy concerns itself with typically Kantian
problems viewed from a linguistic perspective.

Accordingly,

both Kant and Strawson recognize a special priority given to

spatial and temporal considerations in perception and
cognition.

Each finds space and time the key to the problem

of ob jectif ioation

However, differing from Kant, Strawson believes that the

clue to the problem of explaining how private sense data are

objectified lies in language, the medium of objectivity.
is also seen that the paradigm case of objectivity is our

IQ

Strawson, op. oit .. p. 23

.

It

101

agreement in identifying and referring to
particulars. As
one of the functions of language is to
refer, Strawson
investigates the linguistic process of referring.
Proceeding
accordingly, it is found that we must recognize
the existence
of a conceptual scheme which we all must
possess as a condition
of identifying reference to particulars.
This scheme
is a

unified spatiotemporal framework in which particulars,

ourselves, and our immediate surroundings, have their
place.
Ihus,

space and time serve as the framework in which we
may

organize our individuating thoughts about particulars.

This

conceptual scheme, then, must be presupposed as a condition
of objectivity,

in the sense that the objectivity of

particulars logically involves the necessity of their location
in our spatiotemporal framework.

It may be seen that although Strawson and Kant attack

the problem of objectivity from different perspectives, the

results of their endeavors appear greatly similar.

However,

in the light of our previous discussion of criticism of the

Kantian hypothesis, certain doubts have emerged as to the

validity of Kant’s theory of perception.

Although Strawson

makes few explicit references to the Kantian system, it would

behoove us to examine the Strawsonian contention with an eye
toward improvements which may be made on the doctrine set

forth in the Transcendental Aesthetic.

Such improvements

would make for a more secure version of Kant's philosophy,

giving it a base in language and linguistic philosophy and
rendering it intelligible in the light of the previously

.
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discussed criticism.

Let us proceed to this
attempt.

It is

immediately to be noted that
Strawson finds space
and time to be part of a
conceptual scheme. Kant, on
the

other hand, maintained that
neither space nor time are
concepts, but are intuitions.
At first glance there seems
to be a basic disagreement
between these two doctrines.
Kant believes tha t we cannot
represent to ourselves the
absence of space or time. U e can
successfully think away
objects, but not their spatiality
or temporality.
Thus,

sp-ce and time are pure intuitions.

However, Strawson states:

... no system which does not allow for
temporal entities can be a system which spatial and
allows for
r
C la 8 a
r at least can be understood
by
L?
u« aR «iU h
h
?
)0irit
iS the Same as that made
1n o \
thatI SpaCe and time are our onl forms
y

n

’

^

orLtuition?§O
It seems,

then, that the Strawson ian conceptual
scheme

and the Kantian theory of sensibility do
not clash as

dramatically as it first appeared.
deals in conception

— the

It is true that Strawson

conceptual use of language in

reference

— while

However,

the Strawsonian conceptual scheme is as
much pertinent

Kant deals in sensation and sensibility.

to perception as it is to conception.

We could not, for

example, perceive a particular objectively without giving it
a place in our spatiotemporal framework.

Thus, both Kant and

Strawson seem to be saying the same thing; that space and time
must be presupposed as a condition of objective knowledge of
a particular.

20

Strawson, op. cit
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However, Kant maintained that
space is the form of outer
intuition and time the form of
inner intuition. As such,
all
representations are in inner sense, of
which time is

the form;

only some representations occurring
in outer sense in which
space is the form. On the other
hand, Strawson presents us
with a formal spat io temporal framework
in which
space and

time are of equal importance.
asks:

In this connection,

Strawson
"Could there be a scheme, providing
for a system of

objective particulars, 'which was wholly
non-spatial?
Indeed, the second chapter of Individuals
explores the

possibility of a no-space world.

This attempt, Strawson

admits, fails due to the impossibility of
arriving at a scheme
that would explain how recurring auditory
objects could be

individuated.

However, these considerations aside, it is

important to note that Strawson believes that space and
time
must work together as a spatiotemporal framework.

He states:

We operate with the scheme of a single, unified
spatiotemporal system. The system is unified in
this sense.
Of things of which it makes sense to
inquire about the spatial position, we think it is
always significant not only to ask how any two such
things are spatially related at any one time, the
same for each, but also to inquire about the spatial
relations of any one thing at any moment of its
history, when the moments may be different. Thus we
say: A is now in just the place where B was a thousand
years ago.
'e have, then, the idea of a system of
elements every one of which can be both spatially and
temporally related to every other. 22
If you recall,

21

this was Baton's point of criticism of the

Ibid

.

,

p. 62.

^ Ibid

.

.
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31.
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Kantian doctrine.
of space and time.

He similarly called for the
togetherness

Thus, the togetherness of space and
time

as a spatioternporal framework seems to
be somewhat of an

improvement upon the Kantian contention, while
still retaining
the Kantian meaning.
As previously discussed, one of the faults found
with
the Kantian theory of sensibility concerned his
notion of

geometry.

According to Kant, our pure intuition of space is

responsible for the certainty of geometry, in this case,
Euclidian geometry.

It has been pointed out that Kant was

wholly unaware of the possibility of constructing nonEuclid ian geometries as certain and as true of the world as
his own Euclidian.

The idea that geometry and mathematics

may be presented as formal systems without regard to empirical

considerations was unknown at Kant's time.

Many believe

Kant's theory of mathematics and geometry is an integral part
of his system.

The failure of this theory to stand up to

modern developments in mathematics and geometry, it is believed,
easts grave doubts upon the entire Kantian theory of knowledge.

Whether or not this strongly critical view of Kant is

philosophically tenable will not be decided here.

It is,

however, important to note that Strawson's formulation avoids

Kant's assumptions of the nature of mathematics and geometry.

While Kpnt maintains that pure intuitions of space and time
account for mathematical and geometrical certainty, Strawson
makes no such demands upon his spatioternporal framework.
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Let us now investigate Russell’s
criticism of the Kantian
system as it pertains to Strawson's
contention. Russell, it
is recalled, asked for an
explanation of why particulars are
positioned the way they are in time and
space and not otherwise.
It was mentioned that Kant never
seemed to sense the

importance of such an explanation.

enough

Accordingly, it is not

to say that we contribute space and
time to the matter

of sensibility; some additional explanation
is needed to
explain why certain particulars are
spatiotemporally related
to others the way they are.
hart maintained that the manifold of sensation
is unified

(objectified) by the mind’s application of the pure
forms of

space and time.

To be known as objects, the manifold must

first be spatiotemporalized

.

What lies outside of objective

perception is the manifold of things-in-themselves.

Things-

in-themselves are the matter of our sensations, the substratum of sensibility forever unknown to the inquiring mind.
Io is not surprising,

then,

to see that one cannot explain

or defend Kant's system against Russell's criticism.

and time give only the form of sensation.
the matter of sensation is unknowable.

Space

On the other hand,
'e

cannot explain the

relation of objects completely on either level.

However,

Strawson assumes no unknowable substratum of sensation.

While

Kant assumes an intrinsically unknowable "given," Strawson

assumes that the matter of sensation is sense data.

Thus,

Strawson's formulation provides for the same product of
form and matter (perception), while avoiding the pitfalls of
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assuming a given unknowable.

According to Strawson, then,

the peculiar positioning of
particulars is traceable to
the
given and to our linguistic practices
of referring.
In summation, both Kant and
Strawson deal with a similar
problem; how private sense data are
objectified for knowledge.
Kant maintains the existence of pure
spatial and temporal

intuitions through which things-in-themselves
are spatiotemporalized for objectivity. Time is the form
of all

intuitions, space only of some.

On the other hand, Strawson

investigated the media of objectivity, language,
with the
hope of disclosing a conceptual scheme which
we
all must

possess as a condition of our objective reference
to
particulars.

-his scheme was found to be a spatiotemporal

framework in which each particular has its place.

Moreover,

Strawson avoids certain Kantian assumptions which are
no
longer tenable in the light of modern physics and mathematics.
Whereas Kantian philosophy led to the recognition of unknown

things— in— themselves
concept.

,

Ltrawson does without such an ambiguous

As such, Strawson’s account avoids many of the

pitfalls of the Kantian theory of sensibility.

Strawson's philosophy gives substance to Kantian

metaphysics while pruning it of many of its untenable

assumptions and avoidable consequences.

Language is seen to

exhibit the presence of a conceptual scheme embodying a

spatiotemporal framework.

As such, particulars are positioned

according to our linguistic practices of referring.
language is again presented as

a

Thus,

basis for Kantian philosophy.
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are vlewed as embedded
within the structure
of language, composing a
spatiotemporal framework through
whioh our Individuating thoughts
about particulars and
objectification of private sensations
are explained.
'

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the fundamental problem
for Kant is
the problem of knowledge; what is knowledge,
and how is it

possible, what are the boundaries of human reason?

In order

to answer such questions, Kant believes, we
must examine our

organs of knowledge, our ways of knowing.

We must consider

the powers of the mind to attain knowledge, its
functions,
its possibilities

,

its limitations.

Accordingly, we cannot

think unless there is something to think about, and we can

have no object of thought unless it is given through the
senses, unless the mind is receptive or has sensibility.

Sensibility, then, furnishes us with objects of empirical
intuition.

However, these objects must be thought, understood,

or conceived by the understanding for knowledge to occur.

The question, then,
two questions:

"How is knowledge possible?" divides into

"How is perception possible?" and "How is

understanding possible?".
If you recall,

in the realm of sensibility,

the matter

of sensation is given to the inquiring mind as a manifold of

sensation.

The mind, however, contributes form to this

manifold, unifying (objectifying) it as objects of possible

knowledge.

These mental forms, Kant maintains, are pure

intuitions of space and time.

As such,

space and time are not
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realities existing for themselves, nor are
they qualities or
relations of things. They are ways our sensibility
has of

apprehending objects, they are forms or functions
of the senses,
In the realm of the understanding,
objects must be
compared, related, or
Tt

n

synthesized " for knowledge to result.

is Kant’s belief that synthesis proceeds
by way of a set

of formal categories which act a
for these mental operations.

s

criteria and set of rules

Thus, knowledge occurs through

application of the pure concepts of the understanding
(categories)

to objects furnished us by the senses and

perceived as spatial and temporal.
The mind, then, prescribes its laws to nature.

The world

as we know it is pre-organized according to our ways of

knowing.

On this view, man is no longer thought of as a

neutral observer of reality, related to the world as subject
is to object.

Instead, man participates in nature, actively

organizing and structuring it according to the way he perceives
and thinks it.

As such, the world as we know it is a joint

product of the knower and the known.
In the later nineteenth century and early twentieth

century, many philosophers ignored or vehemently criticised

these Kantian ideas.

Early linguistic philosophers, disavow-

ing themselves from the traditional methods of philosophical

speculation, wore even more distrustful of the "teutonic

11

philosophy of Kant and his followers.

One commonly held

opinion was that of Bertrand Russell.

He said the following

of Kant:

1

,
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Hume
awakened him [Kant] from his dogmatic
slumbe s--so at least he says, but the awakening
was only temporary, and he soon invented a
soporific
which enabled him to sleep again.
.

.

.

5

dhile the English speaking world continued to
ignore the

teachings of Kant, the Kantian tradition had not died
in
Germany.

Agreeing with the basic tenets of Kant's philosophy,

Ern s t Cassirer, an avowed neo-Kan tian, endeavored to rebuild
the Kantian scheme in the face of its most devastating

criticism.

Because Kant had based much of the internal work-

ings of his system upon an outmoded Aristotelian logic and

Newtonian science, Cassirer found Kant's system in great need
of revision.

Cassirer's attempt at revision recognized a new

factor serving as a base for Kant's philosophy, a factor which
intrigued most philosophers of the day.
language.

This factor was

As such, Cassirer contended that language presents

the forms in which the manifold of sensation is objectified.

Furthermore, language is seen to provide a more inclusive set
of categories by which these objects are "synthesized” for

knowledge.

Language accomplishes this mission by imbuing its

speakers with "perspectives" in which to interpret the world.
However, Cassirer's view, although quite tenacious,

admits the impossibility of testing its own hypothesis.

If

the world appears to us as so many linguistic "perspectives,"
it necessarily follows that one cannot escape the confines of

"^Bertrand Russell, A History of Nostern Philosophy (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 19^5)
P* 704.
»
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his particular perspective adequately
to judge the theory
under question.
In this connection, two
linguists, Vhorf and
Sapir, formulated a hypothesis strikingly
similar to Cassirer’s
view.
However, as an improvement over the
former thesis, they

contended that their beliefs were amenable to
empirical proof.
w
The so-called Vhorf-Sapir hypothesis" may
be
seen to

assert two doctrines: linguistic relativity and
linguistic
determinism.

Briefly, linguistic relativity maintains that

a given language embodies a world

view— a particular

meta-

physical pattern in which the "kaleidoscopic flux of
experience" is shaped and molded to make for an intelligible
world.

Determinism goes beyond this belief.

It holds that

language not only embodies a world view, but perpetuates that
view.

As such,

one's thought is uniquely determined by what

one's language allows him to think.

Thus, once again language

is seen to provide a basis for the Kantian system.

In

perception and thought the mind is actively engaged in giving
form to the formless "raw feels" of experience.

Knowledge is

seen to arise as a joint effort of the observer and the

observed.

While Kant held that intuitions of space and time

in perception and categories operative in the understanding

present form to the world, Whorf maintains that language
underlies these Kantian forms.
However, a closer study of Whorf 's hypothesis as it is

presented reveals certain difficulties which cast grave doubts
as to its adequacy.

Nevertheless, a mild form of the

doctrine of linguistic relativity has approached the status
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of a scientific hypothesis in the
hands of other researchers.
Accordingly, there is reason to believe
that language does
more than merely mirror or "copy" the world
as traditional

philosophy had assumed.

As such, a given language may be

seen to encourage or discourage its speaker's
formulation of
certain world views or posits of experience. However,
this

sense of linguistic relativity is far from what Whorf
had
claimed.

A* regards Kant, there remains the hope that
future

studies in linguistics and psycho-linguistics may reveal

relationships between language and thought that give further
substance to his basic beliefs.
As previously mentioned, early linguistic philosophers,
by and large, found Kant's philosophy peculiarly distasteful.
£et,

their methods dealt with an area of study pertinent to

Kant's doctrines, namely, the analysis of meaning in language.
In this connection,

several modern linguistic philosophers

have found that an analysis of language yields evidence for
the belief that we all are in possession of a conceptual

scheme by way of which random raw experience is ordered and
structured.

The relationship expressed here is again the

Kantian notion of objectification and synthesis, where the
mind is seen to present form to the formless.

modern philosophers have returned Kant to

a

As such, these

respectable

position in the area of analytic philosophy.
As an example of the presence of Kantian ideas in analytic

philosophy,

I

have presented some of the main points of P.

Strawson's "descriptive metaphysics."

F.

In concept, descriptive

113

metaphysics mirrors the Kantian attempt
at metaphysics, laying
bare "the most general structural
features of
our ordinary

thinking about the world."

2

It is Strawson's contention
that

objectivity is directly connected to reference
to external
objects (particulars)
which in turn is intimately related
,

to language,

the medium in which reference takes place.

of the functions of language, then,

identify particulars.

One

is to refer to and

Upon analysis of linguistic reference,

Strawson is led to the belief that we all possess

a

conceptual

scheme as a condition of particular recognition, i.e.,
objectivity.

temporal.

this conceptual scheme is seen to be mainly
spatio-

ihus,

both Kant and Strawson recognize a special

priority given to spatiotemporal considerations.

Both claim

that the key to understanding the question of how sense data
are

ob jectii ied lies in the nature of our mental processes.

However, Strawson goes beyond Kant in showing that these

mental processes are part and parcel of the workings of our
language.
In summation,

I

have attempted to present the main views

of Kantian philosophy as well as how these views have been

augmented and substantiated by some recent developments in
the general area of philosophy of language.

Philosophy of

language has attempted to render explicit the true functions
of language.

p

In so doing,

it has come to the position that

—

P. P. Strawson, Individuals
An Essay in Descriptive
Metaphysics (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1959^ p. 9.

m
language is more than a mere transparent
medium of
communication, that it may be regulative or
even constitutive
of experience.
As far as this may be true, the
philosophy of
language presents a great deal of substance
to Kant's basic

thought:

that the world "out there" is as much
a product of

tue knower

is

it is a product of the known.

.

.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

—

Ayer, A. J.
Language. Truth, and
Book s, 1946.

Bergmann, Gustav.
Phi] osp-phy

.

Lnr Hr,

New York

:

Dover

"Strawson's Ontology," Journal of
LVII (Sept 15, I960) ,601-625.

Black, Max.
Languag e and Philosophy
university Press, 1949

.

Ithaca: Cornell

.

; re

^^^
e

d

Meta phors

Ithaca: Cornell University

b

Bloomfield, Leonard.

Language

New York: Henry Holt and

.

Britton, Carl.
Communication: A Philosophical Study of
language.
London: Keegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and
Co.,

Brown, Roger.
1958

Ltd.,

1939.

Words and Things

Glencoe, 111 .: Free Press,

.

Buchner, Edward Franklin.
"Kant's Psychology," The
Psychological Review LIV (Jan. 1897), 3-32.
.

Burtt, E. A.
The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science
Garden City, N. Y.
Doubleday and Co., 1958.

.

:

Carnap, Rudolph.
Meaning and Necessity
of Chicago Press 1947

.

Chicago: University

,

Cassirer, Ernst.
Einstein's Theory of Relativity
Dover Books, 1953.
.

Substance and Function

.

.

New York:

New York: Dover Books,

1953.

Language and Myth
Trans, by Susan
New York: Harper Bros., 1946.
.

K.

Danger.

Rousseau. Kant. Goethe: Two Essays
Trans, by
Gutmann, Kristellch, and Randall.
Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1947.
.

The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy. Science
New
and History
Trans, by Wolf lorn and Hendel.
Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.
.

.

.

116

- he Phil osophy Of Symbol In Pftrms
anguage
Trans, by Ralph Manheim.
University Press, 1953

Vol I:
New Haven: Yale

•;

.

.

.

Ab Essay on Nan: An .Intr oduction to the Philosophy
of Human Culture
New Ha v en Yale University Press,
•

7

.

:

19W.
Cassirer

Jirst

c.r itioue

«

London: Simon Shand

Cherry, CoUn.
On Human Communication
Editions, Inc., 1961.

.

New York: Science

Chisholm

H*
?;
A
Cornell

Perceivinpr; A Philosophical Study
University Press, 195?.

Ithaca:

.

_

De Saussure, Ferdinand.
Course in General Linguistics
Trans, by wade Baskin.
New York: Philosophical
Library, 1959.
.

Ferre,

Frederick.
Language Logic and Cod
Harper and Bros., 196 I.
.

New York:

.

Flew, Anthony.
Hume's Philosophy of Belief
Rou tl edge and Keegan Paul, 1961.

London:

.

Garnett, Christopher B. The Kantian Philosophy of Space
New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.
Gellner, Ernest.
Words and Things
Ltd., 1959.

.

London: Victor Gallancy

.

Hamburg, Carl H.
Symbol and Reality: Studies in the
Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer
The Ha ue: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1956.
r

.

Henle, Paul.
Language. Thought, and Culture
Un i versity of Michigan Press, 1958.

.

Ann Arbor:

Hockett, Charles R. A Course in Modern Linguistics
York: The Macmillan Co., 1956

.

Mew

.

Kant, Immanual.
Critique of Pure Reason
Translated and
Edited by Norman Kemp Smith. New York: Modern
Library, 1958.
.

Korner, S.

Kant

.

Middlesex, G. B.

:

Penguin Books Ltd., 1955.

Leibniz: Basic Writings
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm Von.
La Salle, 111.: Open Court, Inc., 1957*

.

Semantics and the Philosophy of Language
Lin sky, Leonard.
Urbana: University Of Illinois Press, 1952.

.

,

,

•

:

.

11 ?

Locke

Berkeley
N.

Martin

''
»

ri

^

^ume.

Doubleday

Y.

The Empiricists
~

Iric.

,

-

T96O.

Garden City,

Gottfried.
Kant's Metaphysics and Theory of
Science
irans by P. o. Lucas.
Manchester, G. B. Manchester
Press, 1961.
.

.

:

’

nmer,

Oscar V.

Ills,

.
.

Kantian Thlnr-In-I tself or the Creative
Phi i.osophical Library 1956.

Me w York.

iiillll •

,

Nag>el

»

Ii

nest * Ifr-S Structure of Science
^
Brace,
and World, l?6l.

Paiget, Jean. Iggic and Psychology
inc
195“
.

j'aton,

.

New York: Harcourt

.

New York: Basic Books

,

J.
Kant's Metaphysics of Experience
London:
Allen and Unwin, Ltd., and New York: Macmillan and
Co., 1951.

h.

.

Pei, Mario

.

jJig

Story of Language

.

New York: Mentor Books,

Pole, David.

The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein
Athlon© Press, 1953

.

London:

Quine, Willard Van Ormand.
From a Logical Point of View .
Cambridge: Harvard Press, 1961.

Methods of Logic
Wins ten, 1961
.

.

New York: Holt, Reinhart, and

•

Word and Object
Boston: Technology Press and
New York: John Wiley and Sons, i960.
.

•

Rand, Benjamin.
Modern Classical Philosophers
The Riverside Press, 1952*

.

Cambridge:

Reichenbach, Hans.
The Rise of Scientific Philosophy
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958.
.

The Philosophy of Time and Space
Trans, by
Maria Reichenbach and John Freund. New York: Dover
Books, 1958.
.

.

Russell, Bertrand.
Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950
Edited by Robert C. Marsh.
New York: The Macmillan
.

Co.,

1956.

A History of Western Philosophy
and Schuster, 1945.
.

Sapir, Edward.
1939.

Language

.

.

New York: Simon

New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.,

V

.

118

—

—

— elected Writi ngs

n

PjrpnMlti..

In Language
Cn bir. a an(
"q
iilited by iJavid 0. Handeltain
~t

Berkeley. University of California
Press, 1951.
"Conceptual Categories of Primitive
°
S
Science, No. ?4 (April, 1931), 560-582. Languages
.

ochilpp

"
’

Paul Arthur.
The Phil osophy of Ernst Cas^r^
St ° n: ThG Llbrary of Living Philosophers,
Inc.,
1949

omith, Norman Kemp.
A Commentary to Kant's CritlmiP
0 f Pure
~
Reason.
London: The Macmillan Co
1918.
.

Stenius, Erik. Wittgenste in's "Trac tatus
University Press, i960.

,

Ithaca: Cornell

Strawson, P. F.
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive
Hetapnysics
London: Methuen and" Co.
1959."
.

,

Sturtevant Edgar H. An Introduction to Linguistic Science
"
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947.
,

•

Lingu is tic Chang e

.

.

New York: Strechert, 1942.

Swanson, J. W.
"Linguistic Relativity and Translation,"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research~ Vol. XXII,
Wo. 2 (December, 1961), 185-192.
.

"Landesman on Linguistic Relativity." The Review
of Metaphysics Vol. XV, No. 2 (December ,"1961)
336-339.
.

"The Revolution in the Philosophy of Language,"
Unpublished article, Department of Philosophy,
University of Massachusetts, 1962.
.

A History of Philosophy
Thilly, Frank.
Holt and Co., 1927.

New York: Henry

.

Urban, Wilbur Marshall.
Language and Reality . London: George
Allen and Unwin Ltd. and New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1951.

Vaihinger, H.
The Philosophy of "As-If"
Trans, by C. K.
Ogden.
London: Keegan Paul, Trench, Tubner and Co.,
Ltd. and New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1924.
.

Whatmough, Joshua.
Language: A Modern Synthesis
Seeker and Warburg, 1956

.

London:

Edited
Language. Thought, and Reality
Whorf, Benjamin Lee.
Press
and
Technology
B.
Boston:
Carroll.
by John
Mew York: John Wiley and Sons, 1956.
.

,

119
V'

lener
’

anTK^o

Wlener>

rSk^scr
W1Uey
*

Chatto

^^ie

te^

A^us?

Wittgenstein, Ludwig
'

195

'jis

'

%

e

B

“ t0n

y

y

i^?^

d

e

s-n^

ii;r

i^^

hT nf Snl

tUry Back

—

*~

n ° l0Ey

•

11

•

«*-

London:

Philosophic al Invest.) ran c.
Trans
New York: The Macmillan Co.','

Ansoorabe -

Whitehead Alfred North.
"Process and Reality," Alfred
horth ihltehead An Anthology
Edited by~ s~ c
aS °" ° r0SS
New York: The Hacmlilan
Co^^Il?
:

—

.

-

Wolfe, J

A First Course in Cryptanalysis
;
Brooklyn College Press,

Ziff, Paul.
Semantic Analysis .
Press, I960.

Zipf

.

New York:

Ithaca: Cornell University

G.^K.
Human Behavior an d the Principle of Least Effort
c am bridge
Addison- W esley Publishing Co., 1949.

’

:

,

Approved by:

Graduate Committee

Date

:

/j

>}

<y

/

J Q,

ry

